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Abstract—Phishing and spear phishing are typical examples of
masquerade attacks since trust is built up through impersonation
for the attack to succeed. Given the prevalence of these attacks,
considerable research has been conducted on these problems
along multiple dimensions. We reexamine the existing research on
phishing and spear phishing from the perspective of the unique
needs of the security domain, which we call security challenges:
real-time detection, active attacker, dataset quality and base-
rate fallacy. We explain these challenges and then survey the
existing phishing/spear phishing solutions in their light. This
viewpoint consolidates the literature and illuminates several
opportunities for improving existing solutions. We organize the
existing literature based on detection techniques for different
attack vectors (e.g., URLs, websites, emails) along with studies on
user awareness. For detection techniques we examine properties
of the dataset, feature extraction, detection algorithms used,
and performance evaluation metrics. This work can help guide
the development of more effective defenses for phishing, spear
phishing and email masquerade attacks of the future, as well as
provide a framework for a thorough evaluation and comparison.
Index Terms—Phishing, spear phishing, usable security, email,
website, URL, dataset properties, unique challenges of security
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet users continue to be plagued by many attacks,
which include: spam, phishing, spear phishing, masquerade,
and malware delivery. Spam is an advertisement and its most
pernicious effect is the loss of time and productivity. Phishing
and spear phishing are more damaging. In these attacks, the
attacker impersonates a trusted entity with an intent to steal
sensitive information or the digital identity of the target, e.g.,
account credentials, credit card numbers, etc. The difference
between them is that spear phishing is more targeted and
phishing is more indiscriminate. Both of them are cases of
masquerade attacks which involve impersonation. However,
this type of attack (masquerade) tends to have broader objec-
tives. Examples include: planting fake news, sowing divisions
in communities (e.g., the case of WhatsApp in India), and
swaying opinions (e.g., the case of stealing elections). The
phrase malware delivery is self-explanatory.
Email continues to be one of the most convenient and popu-
lar vectors of choice for the above attacks. An email is usually
embedded with a poisoned link to a fraudulent website set up
to trick the victim. However, with the growing popularity of
social networks, a new medium for spreading malicious links
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is also available in the form of instant messaging applications,
chat services, etc.
The persistent popularity of phishing and spear phishing
with attackers [1], [2], comes from the fact that they exploit
the human element (“weakest link”) [3] and do not require any
actual intrusion into the system or network. Phishing/spear
phishing attacks have been successfully used to bring well-
protected companies to their knees (e.g., the attack on RSA as
described in [4]) and estimates of losses from phishing alone
run into several hundred million dollars in the US. In addition
to the monetary loss, there is also a loss of time, productivity,
and damage to reputation. Besides stealing sensitive informa-
tion, email attachment and web links in the emails are the most
common way of spreading malware, for example, 9 out of 10
phishing emails detected in Verizon network on March 2016
carried ransomware [5]. Previous phishing studies have found
that phishing is “far more successful than commonly thought”
and it is the main mechanism for manual account hijacking
[1], [6].
Despite more than a decade of research on phishing, it
still continues to be a serious problem. There could be
several reasons for this: the problem itself may be intractable,
the technical approaches so far may have missed important
parameters of the problem, phishing exploits the human as
the weakest link so purely technical approaches may not be
sufficient, or some combination of these. To expose the reasons
for the continued success of phishing, we survey the detection
literature and user studies on phishing and spear phishing.
We found that researchers have tackled phishing/spear
phishing in many papers, and there are several surveys of
these attempts. However, we discovered that there are certain
methodological issues with phishing detection research. For
example, we notice:
• The use of balanced datasets and inappropriate metrics
• Unreported training and testing times
• Lack of generalization studies
• Also in user studies, we find the multiple comparison
issue
Many surveys have missed quite a few of these issues, e.g.,
the dataset diversity issue is never mentioned. Challenges such
as base-rate fallacy, active attacker and generalization studies,
which we collectively call “security challenges” are rarely
mentioned, let alone emphasized. We identify the required set
of challenges in cybersecurity based on those outlined in [2],
[7].
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Our goal is to reinvigorate research on these problems and
reorient it towards solving the urgent, practical needs of the
security domain [2]. Hence, we reexamine the previous litera-
ture on phishing and spear phishing from the viewpoint of the
unique needs of the security domain, which we elaborate upon
in Section IV, to determine the appropriateness of the proposed
solutions. To our knowledge, a comprehensive evaluation of
the appropriateness of the previous research on phishing and
spear phishing from the security perspective has not been done
before. A better understanding of the previous studies in this
light will foster research on effective and practical defenses
for these problems. Such a perspective will also provide a
framework for a thorough evaluation of current and future
solutions. User studies are also important for stopping the
phishing attacks since attackers try to elude computer users.
No matter how good the detection system works, end users
should be prepared for the different types of attacks. So,
we also review the phishing user studies in addition to the
detection techniques. We observed that there are quite a few
existing surveys on phishing emails, significantly fewer on
phishing websites and Uniform Resource Locators (URLs),
and none on user studies. However, we did not find any survey
on phishing or spear phishing that emphasized the unique
needs of the security domain and examined the research from
this perspective. Our contributions are as follows:
• We adapt the security challenges in cybersecurity [2], [7]
to the field of detecting phishing URLs, websites, emails
and user studies.
• We collect and review a comprehensive list of literature
on phishing and spear phishing detection systems as well
as user studies.
• We conduct a systematic review of the phishing detection
research with a focus on: the features extracted, detection
methods used, properties of the evaluation dataset (source,
size, class ratio, diversity, recency), evaluation metrics for
studying system performance.
• We investigate the diversity of several popular URL,
website and email datasets.
• We select and discuss well-cited literature based on
their contributions from the perspective of the security
challenges addressed by the authors.
• We summarize the best practices observed in the studied
phishing detection literature.
Paper Organization:
Section II describes our search for relevant literature, which
is important for the reader to understand the exact contours of
our systematization. Then, we discuss essential background
(Section III) and security challenges (Section IV). Common
notations for a thorough review of detection research and user
studies are in Section V. We investigate phishing detection
research in Sections VI, VII, and VIII. Opportunities for future
work are discussed in Section IX. We analyze user studies
in Section X, and compare our work with related work in
Section XI. Section XII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE COLLECTION
We followed a systematic methodology to search the rele-
vant research papers and surveys, which address phishing and
spear phishing attacks. According to DBLP (Digital Bibliog-
raphy & Library Project), the first phishing papers appeared
in 2004,1 and there are 732 papers from 2004-2017.2 For
comparison, a publication search with keyword ‘spam’ on
DBLP yields 2,213 papers (the query, ‘spam$’, exact word
match for spam, yielded 1,785 papers), but this is an estimate,
since it includes opinion/review spam papers and also more
than 100 matches with author last name “Spampinato.”
To gather the research papers for this study, at first we used
the queries “phish URL, phish link, phish site, phish web, phish
email/e-mail” independently on four databases: DBLP, ACM
Digital Library, IEEE Xplore, and Google Scholar (allintitle
query). We also found many papers that study phishing as
part of malicious and malware centric behavior. Therefore,
we added the following additional queries (without quotes) -
“malware URL, malicious URL, malware link, malicious link,
malware site, malicious site, malware email/e-mail, malicious
email/e-mail.” However, we only consider research specific to
phishing attack vectors – URL, email and websites. Papers
which propose mainly malware detection techniques are be-
yond the scope of this survey. To search for relevant literature
on spear phishing, we used the queries “spear phishing” (this
query also covers spear-phishing) and “spearphishing.” The
queries “spear phish” and “spearphish” did not yield any
additional results. Later, we realized that authors sometimes
just use “phishing detection” or “phishing attack,” or some
other variation. So we expanded our search using “phish” and
“phishing” to the above databases.
For this paper, we mainly focus on research published
between the years 2010-2017. We cover papers appearing up
to March 2018, and any pre-2010 paper that is highly cited
or appeared in a major security venue. We also cover general
phishing surveys appearing up to 2018.3 Our search gave us
over 734 papers on phishing detection and user studies, which
we then reduced using the conference/journal CORE rankings
of B or higher to approximately 300 papers.4
Figure 1 shows the distribution of papers covered based
on the publication year and type: URL detection, website
detection, email detection and user studies (papers published
between 2010-2017). It shows a significant increase in atten-
tion to the user studies (a 20% increase from 2014 to 2016)
compared to other areas. This could be due to the increasing
use of spear phishing attacks. It is also clear that more
papers focused on phishing URL detection during 2014-2016.
Surprisingly, phishing email detection seems to be falling out
of favor. Note that if an email detection paper also used URL
features for detection (70% of email detection papers do this),
we classify it as an email paper for this figure, and similarly if
a phishing website detection paper used URL features (64%),
then we classify it as a website paper.
1There is a 1997 MIT thesis starting with PHISH, but this is an acronym and
means something completely different. There is also a book called Phish.net
in 1997, but this is a web community regarding the music band called Phish.
2Keyword search, phish, on 6 May 2018.
3This list includes ACM’s CCS, ASIACCS, CODASPY, TISSEC journal,
IEEE’s Trans. on DSN, Trans. on Forensics, Symp. on Security and Privacy,
Security and Privacy Mag., USENIX Security, NDSS, ACSAC and ESORICS.
4If a conference or journal was unranked by CORE, we use Google Scholar
H5 index of ≥ 20 as our guideline.
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Fig. 1: The number of papers that we cover in this survey for each year based on their type (from 2010 to 2017). Numbers
inside the bars denote the count of phishing URL, website, email and user study papers in each year. The numbers in front of
each bar is the total count of papers in that year.
During our search, we also found a number of surveys
on various aspects of phishing. Before we begin, we should
clarify that it is very difficult to directly compare the proposed
systems in literature, since most of them used different datasets
for evaluation. Even if the same sources were used, e.g.,
Phishtank and Alexa, we still cannot compare them directly
because these datasets are updated regularly. The situation is a
little different for emails since several research papers use the
same phishing email datasets, which are publicly available.
However, the legitimate datasets used are different because
researchers use their own or a private company’s emails.
We could compare the detection rate for the phishing email
datasets used, but it would not be an accurate comparison since
the training is done using both datasets.
III. BACKGROUND
A. Phishing and Spear Phishing
As reported by many surveys, the first phishing attack
is supposed to have occurred in 1995 on America Online
(AOL). Phishing has been one of the preferred methods used
by attackers to lure unsuspecting victims. There is ample
literature on the steps involved in a phishing attack (see [8],
[9] for example). As suggested in [8], the phishing process
can be divided into five steps: reconnaissance, weaponiza-
tion, distribution, exploitation, exfiltration. It starts with the
attacker, disguised as a legitimate entity (reconnaissance).
Then they host a website similar to the target (weaponization)
and send an attack vector (usually an email) to the victim
(distribution). The attackers may also spread such links using
social networking sites, instant messaging applications, etc.
The attackers use innovative methods to exploit the weakness
of humans to make them think the fraudulent websites are
legitimate (exploitation), e.g., using URLs which are similar
to the original one (paypa1.com instead of paypal.com). In the
last step, attackers collect the sensitive information exposed by
victims (exfiltration). For spear phishing, we refer the reader
to [10].
Estimates of the economic damage caused by phishing can
be found in [11], and the growth or prevalence of phishing
can be seen from reports by Anti-Phishing Working Group
(APWG) [12]. Besides these papers, noteworthy is a study
of phishing networks by “spidering” chat rooms across major
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) servers [13] and a study of the
economics on phishing from the perspective of all phishers
treated as a group [14]. Authors argue that the average payoff
for a phisher is likely to be small under certain assumptions.
This result does not tell us about the distribution, which could
be highly skewed with a high median for example. Also, if
the payoff is low for some phishers, many of them may be
discouraged and move to greener pastures until the situation
“improves” for the rest, which will attract more phishers. Thus,
the cycle repeats.
B. Modus Operandi of Phishing
Several studies examined aspects of how phishers create
their attacks and how they deceive their victims [15]–[19].
In [15], researchers analyzed a proprietary dataset and found
that phishing domain names have a different length distribution
from legitimate domains and a different character frequency
distribution from that of standard English text. Cova et al.
[16] and McCalley et al. [17] analyzed phishing kits, which
are packages that contain easy-to-deploy, complete phishing
websites downloaded from the Internet. They found in these
kits examples of obfuscation and also backdoors, which send
information collected to a third party. Thus, they were being
used to fool gullible users as well as naïve phishers. More
recently, Han et al. [18] created a honeypot to attract phishers
so that they could analyze live phishing kits. They have several
interesting results on the duration and other characteristics of
the phishing life cycle from deployment to blacklisting. In
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Fig. 2: Different stages of a typical phishing detection system
with the critical challenges associated at each stage
[19], authors have made a detailed study of vulnerabilities
exploited and technical approaches in phishing attacks.
C. Variations on Phishing
Because it exploits the weakest link in the security chain,
i.e. humans [3], phishing is now moving to social networks,
and also SMS/text messages (smishing).5 Other variants of
phishing include vishing (voice-based phishing) and QRishing
(phishing using QR codes). However, there are only a handful
of papers on these topics, as shown in [1], [19].
D. Phishing Detection
Blacklists are a commonly used method to thwart phishing
attacks [20]. The popular blacklists like PhishTank are created
using crowd-sourcing but have two shortcomings - i. manual
maintenance, ii. newer phishing attacks launched for short time
5https://www.wandera.com/mobile-security/phishing/mobile-phishing-
attacks/
windows may remain undetected [21], [22]. Thus, to overcome
these issues, data science methods have gained popularity
with researchers to detect phishing websites and emails. They
use dataset of legitimate and phishing URLs/emails to train
different classification models [8]. Then, these models can be
used to either build and update a blacklist or detect phishing
URLs/emails in real-time while internet users open a website
or email.
Figure 2 illustrates the stages of a machine learning based
phishing detection system. It starts with one or more datasets
and extracts features from different components of web-
site/email (e.g., URL, HTML, email header, etc.). In the
next step, the extracted features are fed to the learning algo-
rithms to extract the patterns/rules for distinguishing legitimate
email/URLs from phishing. In the fourth step, the effectiveness
of the model will be evaluated using different metrics. Finally,
the results will be interpreted and the best models and features
will be determined, with insights on what worked best or
worst. We review the different techniques proposed/used by
researchers in more details in Sections VI, VII and VIII.
E. Human Vulnerability
Machine learning techniques are not 100% accurate. More-
over, models trained on historical data may fail to identify
newer types of attacks. Therefore, the user also becomes an
important element in the detection cycle. Understanding the
users’ behavior as well as training them to properly detect
attack vectors play an important role in the prevention of
phishing attacks.
There are some vulnerabilities in human cognition which
help attackers in deceiving people. Researchers in [23] cate-
gorized emails based on their intention into four groups: (1)
Risk or Loss (2) Benefit or Gain (3) Account Information
and (4) Information Only. The first category uses the sense of
urgency and panic to make people click on a link and expose
their sensitive information. The second group uses people’s
excitement about receiving a big prize to lure them. The last
two groups are not as pressing as the first two which make
them look more legitimate for non-expert users. A study of
phishing emails sent to about 6 million people, conducted by
KnowBe4 [24], revealed that people fall for attacks belonging
to groups 1 and 2 more frequently than the other types. Their
results showed that the click rate is higher for the emails which
promise money or threaten loss of money.
In this paper, we also cover the user studies to have a
thorough overview of the different aspects of the detection
cycle. Before reexamining the phishing detection literature
and user studies from the security viewpoint, we examine the
specific needs of the security domain, which we call security
challenges.
IV. SECURITY CHALLENGES
The security domain imposes a number of challenges on
data science methods that are typically used to detect phish-
ing and spearphishing attacks [2], [7]. In [2], the following
challenges were identified.
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1) Active attacker: In the security domain, there is an
adversary who is constantly trying to learn the defensive
methods being employed and working to defeat them.
For this reason, defenders need to design methods that
can detect new attacks (zero-day attacks) or variations
of existing attacks, not just the ones seen in the past.
Supervised machine learning methods perform well if
the test data has the same/similar distribution as the
training data, but this “stationarity” assumption may not
hold in practice because of active attackers (adversarial
setting), so retraining of the model or online learning
methods are required.
2) Base-rate fallacy: The incidence of an attack, i.e. the
base-rate, has a bearing on the likelihood that something
classified as an attack is actually an attack. In a big
company like Chevron, the number of legitimate emails
sent and received is in the millions per day and the
attacks may only be a few 10s to 100s [25]. For example,
if the incidence of an attack is 10% and a classifier
is 90% accurate, then the probability that a scenario
classified as an attack is actually an attack is only 50%.
The ratio between positive and negative samples used
for system evaluation and the use of appropriate metrics
are a major concern for security researchers.
3) Time scale of attacks: An attack can be over very
quickly, so we may need real-time prevention/detection.
In the case of phishing detection, the volume of data that
has to be processed, e.g., emails, necessitates efficient
and fast methods.
4) Dataset Issues: There are four dataset issues: availability,
diversity, recency, and quality. Because companies are
worried about the damage to their reputation [25], there
is a reluctance to share attacks. Hence researchers have
limited data sources available, which also has an adverse
effect on diversity and quality of datasets. By quality, we
mean how well the dataset represents the real scenario.
For example, if the real scenario is extremely unbalanced
as for spear phishing emails, then the test dataset should
reflect this. Recency of datasets also plays an important
role in system evaluation.
Other challenges mentioned in [2] include: asymmetrical and
user-dependent costs of misclassification (e.g., misclassifying
phishing emails is less costly than misclassifying legitimate
emails for an expert, but for a beginner the opposite may be
true6), unbalanced datasets (this is related to the base-rate fal-
lacy), the pernicious effects of false alarms, the semantic gap
(the gap between the classifier’s decision and the explanation
for that decision; many machine learning methods provide
no human-readable explanation of their decision), and the
opportunity for attackers to poison publicly-available datasets.
In [7], the researchers identified the following challenges
that are specific to applying machine learning for intrusion
detection: outlier detection setting, the high cost of mis-
classification, semantic gap, diversity of network traffic, and
6An expert is an individual who is familiar with such targeted attacks and
the attackers’ modus operandi; while a beginner is usually an individual with
little to no prior exposure to such attacks.
difficulties with evaluation. Difficulties with evaluation were
further elaborated upon as data difficulties, mind the gap, and
adversarial setting. Figure 2 shows the relevant and critical
challenges at each step of phishing detection.
In this paper, we focus on the following challenges, which
are the most important in the phishing context: adversarial
setting, fast and efficient detection, dataset issues, base-rate
fallacy, and evaluation metrics. The semantic gap is also an
important issue, but there has been hardly any progress in this
dimension. The pernicious effect of false alarms, i.e., flagging
a legitimate email as phishing, implies that the false alarm
rate should be kept low, but the threshold is subjective and
hence hard to treat objectively in scientific research. Similar
observations hold for user-dependent misclassification cost.
V. COMMON NOTATIONS AND ORGANIZATION
In reviewing the phishing detection schemes, we focus on
the following key attributes, which are essential for robust
detection.
A. Key Attributes for Phishing Detection
• Nature and Source of data: Nature and source of data:
Information about the nature and composition of the
data i.e. malware, phishing, or spam. In addition to the
sources of the dataset and their availability, datasets’
sizes, quality, diversity, and recency. This stems directly
from the dataset concerns.
• Feature Extraction: Description of the types of features
extracted from the datasets for detection and analysis of
URLs, websites, or emails along with any feature selec-
tion techniques like information gain. Feature extraction
has implications for speed, efficiency, and robustness. To
have a better understanding of the feature’s effect on
detection systems, we discuss two important properties
of the features: feature size and processing time. Feature
size is important since it can affect the detection time of
systems. For example, using term frequency as a feature
increases the number of features dramatically, which may
slow down some classifiers (and require more resources)
if the feature space becomes too large. Processing time
can affect the response time of the detection system. If
generating a feature takes a long time it can delay the
system’s response.
• Classification methods: This includes the type of de-
tection technique (e.g., machine learning, rule/pattern
based, or heuristic) used. We also include fine-grained
attributes such as supervised or unsupervised, running
times for training and testing the system, specifications
of the architecture used and whether system retraining
frequency was specified. These attributes contribute to the
speed and efficiency of the proposed system.
• Experimental setup/methodology: This is related to ad-
versarial issues and replicability of the work. It includes
system evaluation details, e.g., testing it in a real-time
setting, whether the system was tested across various
domains (e.g., if a model trained on phishing links was
also tested on spam, etc.), and how was ground truth
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obtained. Moreover, if the proposed system was evaluated
for robustness, the parameters or metrics were used
for system evaluation, and whether the experiment was
realistic.
B. Common Notations for Detection Sections
We briefly explain the common notations and terminologies
that we will be using throughout the paper in this section.
Features Tables. For each feature, we report two criteria: Fea-
ture Size (FS) and Processing Time (PT). These criteria were
selected keeping in mind the goals and security challenges
mentioned in Sections I and IV, respectively. We consider
feature sizes less than 10 as Small, between 10 to 100 as
Medium, and more than 100 as Large. For PT, we group
the processing times of less than 100 milliseconds as short,
between 100 milliseconds and 1 second as moderate, and more
than 1 second as high.
A number of phishing website and email detection tech-
niques use URL features along with other host/networking
features. Therefore, we highlight the papers that use URL
features for phishing website detection, e.g., in Table A10,
under the name ‘uW.’ Papers that study URL features extracted
from phishing emails are tagged with ‘uE’.
Notations V.1: Summary of the notations used in the
tables
Features Tables: Notations used in Tables I, VIII, XV
FS: Feature Size, FS ∈ {Small,Medium, Large}
PT: Processing Time, PT ∈ {Short,Moderate, High}
Dataset Sources Tables: Notations used in Tables II, III, IV, IX, X
Misc.: Miscellaneous Sources
pvt.: Private sources
pub.: Publicly available sources
Dataset Sizes Tables: Notations used in Tables V, XI, XVII
Ns: Where N varies from 100 to 100,000
≥ 1M: Greater than equal to 1 million
N/A: Not applicable
Cell colors: Red: highly used (≥6 papers), yellow: moderately used (≥3 and
<6), green: rarely used (≤2 papers), white: not used.
Evaluation Metrics Tables: Notations used in Tables VII, XIV, XX
CMx: Confusion Matrix
Acc: Accuracy
PRF: Precision, Recall, and F1-Score
ErR: Error Rate
AUC: Area Under Curve
Cell colors: Same conventions as for Dataset Sizes Tables. Red: highly used
(≥ 6 papers), etc.
Dataset Sources Tables. If researchers used private or
‘unnamed’ sources, these are listed under ‘Miscellaneous
(pvt.)’ and for sparsely used public sources, we include them
under ‘Miscellaneous (pub.)’. We list data collected by the
authors under ‘Author (pvt.)’. Some papers do not reveal
dataset source(s) - we include these papers under ‘N/A’ (Not
Available).
Dataset Sizes Tables. In the dataset sizes tables, the number
‘100s’ denotes that the total dataset size (training and testing
combined) used for evaluation is between 100-999. Similarly,
1000s denotes dataset sizes in the range 1000-9999, etc.
Metrics Tables. The notations in all metrics tables (e.g.,
Table VII) are as follows: CMx - Confusion Matrix (a matrix
with the number of true positives (TP), true negatives (TN),
false positives (FP) and false negatives (FN)); Acc - Accu-
racy (Equation (1)), PRF - Precision, Recall, and F1-Score
(Equations (2), (3), and (4)), ErR - Error Rate (1−accuracy),
AUC - Area Under an ROC Curve (the area under the
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve is a measure
of system accuracy). There are also some other metrics which
are more appropriate for unbalanced datasets, e.g., Geometric
Mean (G-Mean), Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC),
and Balanced Accuracy [26]. Equations (5), (6) and (7) are
the formulas for these metrics. P and N are the size of positive
and negative classes, respectively.
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(1)
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(2)
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
(3)
F1 =
2 ∗ Precision ∗ Recall
Precision + Recall
(4)
G − Mean =
√
TP
TP + FN
∗ TN
TN + FP
(5)
MCC =
TP ∗ TN − FP ∗ FN√(TP + FP)(TN + FN)(P)(N) (6)
Balanced Accuracy =
TP
P
+
TN
N
(7)
Dataset Diversity. We analyze the diversity of content found
in websites and email bodies by converting them into vec-
tor representation using Term Frequency-Inverse Document
Frequency (TFIDF), a term weighting scheme that uses term
frequency in a document and log of the inverse popularity of
the term in the collection [27]. This is defined by Equation
(8) below, where nt,d is the number of times term t appears
in a document d, Nd is the total number of terms in d, D
is the total number of documents, and dt is the number of
documents with the term t in it.
TFIDF(t, d) = nt,d
Nd
∗ loge( D1 + dt ) (8)
TFIDF tries to capture the importance of a word in a doc-
ument. Words that appear in several documents are devalued
since they are worse at distinguishing between the documents.
Before converting the content to TFIDF vectors, we remove
the uninformative and commonly used words such as the, a,
and in (called stopwords). We use the stopwords list provided
in Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK). Then we use cosine
similarity, Equation (9), to measure the similarity between the
vectors. Cosine similarity is the cosine of the angle between
the two vectors.
similarity(A, B) = cos θ = A.B| |A| | | |B | | (9)
Organization of each detection section. We start our dis-
cussion by showing the structure of a URL/website/email
and the features that can be extracted from it. We then
describe the methods used for phishing URL/website/email
detection, the datasets employed, and the metrics studied in
previous research. We close the section with research that has
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addressed at least a few of the key security challenges and
some opportunities for future research.
We now organize and assess the phishing detection tech-
niques and user studies from the standpoint of the above
security challenges. Many researchers have focused on URL
analysis as one way (sometimes the only way) of detecting
phishing websites. We reexamine this line of research first.
VI. PHISHING URL DETECTION
Based on the above key attributes (Section V-A), we reex-
amine 61 relevant research papers on phishing URL detection.
A. URL Structure
A URL is defined as a reference or an address to a resource
on the Internet. In Figure 3, we demonstrate the structure of
a typical URL.7
Fig. 3: Example of a complete URL with its typical compo-
nents
1) Scheme: This identifies the protocol to be used to access
the resource on the Internet. Common protocols are Hy-
perText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Secure HyperText
Transfer Protocol (HTTPS).
2) Host: The hostname or domain name refers to the
human-readable name for the address at which the
resource can be accessed using the URL. In the above
example, www.example.com acts as the hostname.
3) Port: The port number follows the hostname or the
Internet Protocol (IP) address. The Transfer Control
Protocol (TCP) looks at the port to identify the type of
communication between the client (asking for resource
access) and the server (granting resource access) pro-
cesses. Here, the port number 1030 acts as the TCP
port.
4) Path: This indicates the path to the exact location of the
resource on the host. In the above example, the resource
resides at the location ‘/software/index.html/ ’.
5) Query: The query string if provided follows the path
component and provides a string of information with a
specific purpose. In the above example, the query string
‘q=user’ will prompt the server to access the user page.
The symbol ‘?’ separates the path and the query.
B. Features
A large number of features can be extracted from the
URL like the presence of certain tokens or words, token
length, and frequency, count of special symbols, as well as
the presence of any meta-symbols, such as the @ symbol
7"Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI): Generic Syntax",
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2396.txt.
(which is interpreted in a special way by the browser). A URL
can also be considered as a string of characters, and lexical
features, e.g., edit distance, character n-gram frequencies (i.e.,
sequences of n characters), etc., can be used.
We group the different features used in phishing URL de-
tection literature into four major classes: (i) Lexical properties,
(ii) Obfuscation (use of encoding in URL, use of ‘&’, ‘%20’
instead of space, etc.) and Shortened URL properties (use of
goo.gl, bit.ly, tinyurl services for shortening and obfuscat-
ing long malicious links [30]), (iii) Hostname and Domain
Name System (DNS) based properties, and (iv) IP address
and WHOIS properties (WHOIS server details e.g., the date
of registration, update, and expiration). The aforementioned
taxonomy has been developed after careful consideration of
previous literature including related surveys, e.g., [31], [32].
Table I lists URL feature classes along with feature size
and processing time required for each feature. A majority
of the lexical features – target word frequency, frequency
of alphanumeric characters, character n-grams, bag-of-words,
etc., – need higher processing time. Similarly, we note that,
for obfuscation based properties, the processing time ranges
from short to moderate. IP address based features – the
presence of encoding in IP, is the IP blacklisted or whitelisted,
etc., – have short to moderate feature sizes and processing
times. Retrieving WHOIS based information (e.g., creation,
update and expiration dates of WHOIS information, WHOIS
registration details) involves querying WHOIS servers, which
in turn increase the feature processing time.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of URL feature classes
based on their usage across the three dimensions of phishing
detection - URL (U), website content (W) and email content
(E). According to Figure 4, the most popular feature types used
across all dimensions are: obfuscation-based, lexical-based and
DNS-based properties. Table A10 in the Appendix gives a
more detailed breakdown of the literature based on types of
features extracted. We now consider the detection methods that
have been used in the phishing URL detection literature.
C. Detection Methods
Researchers have proposed a variety of detection meth-
ods for phishing URL detection. These methods vary from
blacklist/whitelist based techniques to machine learning based
algorithms.
We show the major classes of machine learning algorithms
used in phishing URL detection literature in Figure 5. The
papers are categorized based on the type of learning method
– supervised (popular techniques are Decision Tree, Random
Forest, Support Vector Machines, Naïve Bayes, and Logis-
tic Regression), Unsupervised (K-Means Clustering), Online
learners (Confidence Weighted, Adaptive Regularization of
Weights, etc.). A few papers employ rarely-used methods, e.g.,
association rule mining and Markov models. Clearly, a major-
ity of the proposed systems are supervised. Other promising
learning approaches, such as rule-based, unsupervised, and
semi-supervised approaches, remain largely unexplored. Of the
supervised methods, only one paper [33] used deep learning
in the form of Recurrent Neural Networks. Table A4 (in
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TABLE I: Features used in phishing URL detection. For uncommon features, we cite the paper which best describes it.
Lexical properties Criteria Obfuscation and ShortenedURL properties
Criteria Hostname and DNS
properties
Criteria IP address and
WHOIS properties
Criteriaa
FS PT FS PT FS PT FS PT
URL Length S S Special CharactersFrequency M M Token Frequency M M
Characters and
digits in IP M S
Length of
URL parametersa S S IP address obfuscation S S Longest Token S S IP Encoding S M
Token/Word
Frequency S S URL encoding S M Digit frequency S S Blacklisted IP S H
Blacklisted Word
Frequency S M URL shortening S M
Frequency of special
characters in domains M S Whitelisted IP S H
Freq. or Ratio of
Digits and Characters M S URL path spoofing S M Port presence S S
IP records and
prefix checking [28] M H
Number of Dots (.) S S Mismatch in URLsource and destination S H HTTPS/HTTP S S
WHOIS Registration
details M H
Characterb
Frequency M M
IP address instead
of domain name S S Misspelled/Bad domains S M
Creation, Update, Expiration
date of WHOIS info. [28] S H
Kolmogorov
Complexity S M Hostname obfuscation
f S M TLD features [28] M H AS Number S H
Character Ngrams L H Entry point URLfrequency [29] S M TTL value
c S M Status of WHOIS Entry S H
Edit Dist.,
KL Div., KS-test M M
Position of entry
point URLs [29] S M Age of domain S M Location of IP origin
e M M
URL Entropy S M Number of landing URLs [29] S M
Ranking based
featuresd S M
Nature or Speed
of connection [28] M M
Bag-of-words L M Number of domainnames and IPs S M
a Parameters are parts of URL like scheme, host, path, query string
b Characters like period, slash, etc.
c Time to live
d Alexa Ranking, PageRank scores, search engines lookup
e Continent/country/city
f Hexadecimal encoding
Fig. 4: Distribution of URL features used in the three dimensions of phishing detection: URL (U), website content (W) and
email content (E). Inside each section of the bar, we mention the percentage of papers that use a class of URL-based features.
For example, 50% of the phishing website detection papers that use URL features employ WHOIS properties.
the Appendix) describes the variety of techniques used for
detection of malicious URLs along with citations.
The properties of the dataset play an important role in
building a robust detection system. We discuss these next.
D. Dataset Properties
Critical properties of a dataset include: the source(s) of a
dataset, its diversity or representativeness, its size, its class
distribution and its recency. In this section, we review the
literature based on these properties.
REEXAMINING PHISHING RESEARCH 9
Fig. 5: Algorithms used in phishing URL detection. The number of papers using the method is in parentheses.
1) Dataset sources and availability: In Tables II, III,
and IV, we categorize papers based on the combination
of benign and malicious data sources (phishing, spam, and
malware, respectively) along with their availability (public,
private, deprecated). Figures 6 and 7 show data sources and
the percentage of surveyed literature using each source.
The most popular sources for URL data are: (a) Legitimate:
DMOZ (now deprecated), Alexa.com, Yahoo URL generator
(deprecated) and (b) Phishing: PhishTank, APWG and Open-
Phish. Sources like Alexa.com list domain names only, which
can artificially inflate the results, since such legitimate domains
can be easily distinguished from the complete URLs found
in phishing data sources. A more thorough data collection
involves crawling the top sites from Alexa and subsequent
links from these sites. During our review, we found that many
papers that use Alexa’s ranking fail to mention any preprocess-
ing that addresses this issue. Multiple research papers have
also used DMOZ and Yahoo URL generator as legitimate
sources, which are currently deprecated. In such a situation,
system retraining becomes important and comparing results
becomes harder. PhishTank is a crowdsourced blacklist where
controlling the quality of the URLs8 is critical. Twitter is also
a common platform for sharing malicious URLs. We include
spam and malware URL data sources both in URL and website
sections, primarily because a large number of papers, e.g.,
[34]–[41], use a mix of phishing, malware, and spam data,
collectively termed as “malicious.” We observe little variation
in the dataset sources used for evaluation in the literature, with
a few exceptions. Researchers tend to use publicly available
sources for building their evaluation datasets.
2) Dataset size and class ratio: We expect that an Internet
user will generally encounter a phishing URL significantly
less frequently than a benign one. Thus, researchers should
evaluate their classifiers with different and unbalanced class
ratios. We report the count of phishing URL detection papers
using various combinations of data sizes in Table V. We only
compare the sizes of the phishing datasets with the legitimate,
since it is the main focus of this paper. Table V shows that a
majority of the papers studied report evaluation results only on
balanced datasets, since most papers appear on or close to the
diagonal in the table. Also, only a small subset (approx. 23%)
8If the database contains live websites, absence of repetitive links, only
phishing domains, etc., the quality is better for evaluation.
Fig. 6: Distribution of papers based on legitimate URL source
Fig. 7: Distribution of papers based on phishing URL source
of the surveyed papers has used relatively large (comprising
≥ 100,000s URLs) URL datasets.
Researchers in [29], [40], [41], [79] considered both unbal-
anced and balanced scenarios in their evaluations. In [22], [29],
[39], [40], researchers evaluated their classifiers on varying
ratios (ratios considered were 2:1, 3:2, 8:1, etc.) of benign to
malicious URLs, whereas in [28], [45], [49], [67], [77], [80]
researchers evaluated their classifiers on highly unbalanced
datasets (the benign dataset size is almost 50 times or more)
but fixed ratios. Papers [35], [47], [49], [55], [69] report
moderate benign-to-malicious data ratios (e.g., 2:1, 3:2, 5:1,
etc.). Authors in [30], [43], [46], [54], [81]–[84] used slightly
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TABLE II: Phishing and legitimate URL datasets: sources and availability
Phish.
Legit. DMOZ (dep.) Alexa (pub.) Yahoof(dep.) Twitter (pub.) Miscellaneous Authorc (pvt.) N/A
pub.a pvt.b
PhishTank (pub.) [34], [35], [39][21], [22], [40], [42]–[53]
[21], [35]
[48], [54]
[36], [43], [47]
[40], [49], [54] [33], [34] [55]
[22], [56]
[57], [58]
APWG (pub.) [21], [22] [21] [22]
OpenPhish (pub.) [35], [48] [59]
Twitter (pub.) [29], [30], [60]–[63]
Misc.d (pub.) [64] [65] [38]
Misc.e (pvt.) [54] [54], [66] [67], [68] [69] [70]
N/A [71]–[76]
a CommonCrawl [33], Gmail directory [34], Weibo Sina API [64]
b URL feeds and logs from Web [55], Cyveillance [65], Bitdefender Laboratories [69]
c Datasets collected by authors in [22], [56], [57]
d Phishing messages from Weibo Sina API [64], URLs from UAB Spam DataMine email messages [38], [65]
e Click-through data from the Trend Micro research laboratory [70], Private honeypot [68], T.Co. Labs [67]
f Yahoo URL Generator (http://random.yahoo.com/bin/ryl)
TABLE III: Spam and legitimate URL datasets: sources and
availability
Spam
Legit. DMOZ
(pub.)
Alexa
(pub.)
Misc.a
(pub.)
Authorb
(pvt.) N/A
SpamScatter (pub.) [43] [59]
SpamAssassin (pub.) [34] [34]
Misc.c (pvt.) [21] [38], [72][22], [41]
[38], [41]
[72], [77]
a Gmail directory [34]
b Spam URLs from UAB Spam DataMine email messages [38]
c Private SpamTrap system [72], collected using blacklists and
crowd-sourcing [41], [77]
TABLE IV: Malware and legitimate URL datasets: sources
and availability
Malware
Legit. DMOZ
(pub.)
Alexa
(pub.)
Yahoo
(pub.)
Author
(pvt.)
MalwarePatrol (pub.) [39], [40] [36]
DNS-BlackHole (pub.) [35] [35], [59]
Misc.a (pub.) [35] [35], [48]
Misc.b (pvt.) [78]
a MalwareDomainslist [35] and malwareurl [48]
b Malware private sources [78]
unbalanced, or almost balanced,9 data. Systems in [43], [59],
[73] used more malicious URLs than legitimate ones.
Table A7 (in the Appendix) provides a detailed distribution
of the dataset sizes used in the literature according to their
types (phishing, spam, and malware). Some research papers,
e.g., [22], [28], [39], [85], and some others (Refer to Table
A7), have used millions of URLs (both benign and malicious)
for the evaluation of their systems. But these are usually static
datasets, i.e., data collected over time and stored for usage.
Some researchers go a step further – they deployed and tested
their classifiers in a real-time environment [72], [77], [86].
Moreover, malicious links can be shared via chat sessions and
Twitter feeds – therefore, including the papers that test such
sources (under category Feed) is essential.
Irrespective of size, the datasets may not be diverse. In
the following subsection, we evaluate the diversity of some
popular, publicly-available datasets.
3) Dataset Diversity: We collected phishing URLs from
three different sources PhishTank (22,018 URLs), APWG
9If one class is x times the size of the other class, where 1 ≤ x < 2.
(9,757 URLs) and OpenPhish (5,484 URLs) on Nov 2017,
Alexa as the basis for our legitimate dataset. The collected
phishing URLs are those that are live at the time of collection.
We use the list of top domains from Alexa as a seed for our
crawler10 to generate a more realistic dataset. To increase the
diversity of the legitimate websites, we retrieved the top 40
websites from each category on Alexa11 excluding the three
categories: Adult, Regional, and World. We stopped the crawler
after collecting 91,610 URLs.
Calculating the frequency of domains in each dataset (Fig-
ure 8) revealed that the top 50 domains constitute 24%, 12.6%
and 18% of URLs extracted from OpenPhish, PhishTank, and
APWG respectively. From these percentages, PhishTank seems
to be a more diverse dataset than the other two.
For the Alexa dataset, the top 50 domains comprise 75% of
URLs. However, this can be mitigated by limiting the number
of URLs crawled from each domain in the list. Thus, we
changed our crawler’s configuration to store at most 12 URLs
for each domain. Following this modification, the percentage
of URLs with the top 50 domains in Alexa dataset reduced to
2.3% (out of 21,788 total URLs). When we limit the number of
URLs for each domain, the top N domains variable becomes
a linear function of dataset size. Thus, limiting the number
of URLs collected from each domain can help build a more
diverse legitimate dataset.
In the above experiment, we studied all datasets inde-
pendently. We did not compare the phishing and legitimate
datasets with each other since this would go into the realm of
developing detection techniques, which is beyond the scope of
this paper.
The time period of datasets is also important since a
classifier can overfit on some attributes common to instances
from a specific time period. Such a classifier will fail miserably
on newer kinds of attacks. So, we study the collection time
periods of datasets in the next section.
4) Recency of data collection: Recency of data collection is
an important aspect of the evaluation datasets. Since attackers
tend to launch their attacks for short time windows, malicious
links can become dead quickly. So, URL datasets need to
be collected close to attack launch time. We specify recency
10We limited the crawler to search up to three levels.
11https://www.alexa.com/topsites/category lists 17 domain categories.
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Fig. 8: Cumulative distribution function of the top 50 domains
in the phishing and legitimate dataset (Section VI-D3)
TABLE V: Size ranges of phishing/legitimate URL datasets.
Legitimate
Phishing 100s 1,000s 10,000s 100,000s ≥1 M Feed N/A
100s 4 1
1,000s 6 1 1
10,000s 2 14 7 4
100,000s 3
≥1 M 8 1
Feed 2
N/A 7
in Table VI. It shows the relative age of the dataset, which
is n − m, where m is the year during which the URLs
were collected from the respective sources by the researchers
and n is the year in which the paper was published. Some
researchers (e.g., [29], [68], [77]) explicitly consider the active
attacker and choose to train and retrain their systems on
datasets collected across various time frames. This ensures
better resiliency of the system to newer and probably more
evolved attacks. In Table VI, we mark such papers in bold.
However, a large fraction (approx. 55%) of the papers surveyed
does not report the collection time of datasets.
TABLE VI: Recency of URL datasets used in evaluation.
Papers in bold use data collected from multiple periods.
Recency in year(s) N Literature
Real-time 5 [62], [29], [68], [72], [77], [86]
1 17 [38]–[40], [43], [47], [69], [79], [82], [87][21], [30], [50], [51], [56], [57], [88], [68]
2-3 7 [22], [29], [67], [70], [77], [78], [85]
≥4 5 [21], [41], [49], [89], [68]
We next describe the different evaluation metrics used in
phishing URL detection papers.
E. Evaluation Metrics
The choice of metric(s) is very important for sound system
evaluation. In Table VII, we report papers that use one (along
the diagonal) or a combination of two types of metrics. Papers
that report more than two metrics are discussed but are not
counted in this table. However, 10 out of 61 papers do not
report the evaluation metrics used.
Accuracy and Confusion Matrix are the most popular met-
rics. We group papers that use True Positive, False Positive,
True Negative and False Negative values as metrics (both raw
numbers as well as rates) into the Confusion Matrix (CMx)
category. Next in popularity are: Precision (P), Recall (R),
and F1-score (abbr. F, it is the harmonic mean of precision
and recall) along with Error Rate (ErR). Some papers report
additional metrics, e.g., Receiver Operating Characteristics
(ROC) [49], Area Under Curve (AUC) [35], [43], and clas-
sification costs [80]. A few papers consider combinations of
three or more metrics: Acc, CMx, Other12 in [80], Acc, PRF,
CMx in [69], Acc, PRF, AUC in [33], [35], Acc, PRF, CMx, ErR
in [89] and Acc, PRF, CMx, AUC in [50], [51]. More details
on metrics used along with relevant citations are reported in
Appendix Table A1.
TABLE VII: Distribution of evaluation metrics in phishing
URL detection.
Acc PRF ErR CMx Other1
Acc 5 6 1 5 2
PRF 5 1
ErR 9 1
CMx 4 2
Other 1
1 Balanced Success Rate, Root Mean Square Er-
ror, effective rules/patterns, Cost/Sum of clas-
sification, False Alarm rate
Another important facet to consider is the use of ap-
propriate evaluation metrics when considering unbalanced
datasets. Accuracy is not always the appropriate for multiple
reasons: Base-rate fallacy in Section IV, unbalanced datasets,
and asymmetric costs. Similar is the case for the error rate
metric. ROC, AUC, and confusion matrix values can be better
metrics in such scenarios. Researchers should also use metrics
specifically proposed for unbalanced experiments [26], e.g.,
geometric mean, Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC),
Balanced Accuracy, Balanced Detection Rate [90], etc.
However, of the papers that use highly unbalanced URL
datasets: [28], [49] use error rate, [45] uses false positive and
false negative rates, which is better, since one can calculate
other metrics (if dataset size and distribution of classes is also
reported), [67] uses malicious missing rate and detection rate,
and [41] makes use of popular metrics: accuracy, precision,
recall, F1-score and ROC. Thus, we observe mostly inappro-
priate unbalanced dataset metrics in the studied literature.
F. Selected Phishing URL Detection Papers
We now discuss phishing URL detection papers that ad-
dressed at least a few security challenges. The selection is
based on the number of challenges (Section V-A) addressed.
Zhao et al. [80] proposed a scalable cost-sensitive active
learning (CSOAL) framework that tackled multiple challenges
listed in Section IV. To ensure efficiency and scalability of the
proposed system in a web-based environment, the authors used
online active learners for building the detection model. This
also handled phishing attacks launched with short time win-
dows. Moreover, an online learning algorithm ensured faster
system retraining. To deal with the issue of data availability,
12Classification Cost
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the system used a fraction of the provided dataset during
training. The model was trained using only 0.5% of the data
and was evaluated on a large (1M) and highly imbalanced (99
legitimate to 1 malicious) URL dataset. Thus, their method
also considered class imbalance. The authors proposed two
novel cost-sensitive measures – weighted cost and weighted
sum of sensitivity and specificity for better system evaluation,
but these were not compared to other metrics suitable for
unbalanced data (see Section VI-E). Other experiments include
system scalability and study of training and testing times.
However, the authors did not address the active attacker issue.
In [35], authors proposed a lightweight phishing detection
system using lexical features for link analysis. Such a system
ensures separation between the victim and the attacker; and a
lightweight scheme ensures speed and scalability. The authors
also study system performance by conducting “generalization
experiments” across multiple evaluation datasets of varying
ratios between benign and malicious classes in the dataset
(ratios considered were 3:1, 1:1, and 1:3). Researchers argue
that their work is secure against an active attacker, but do
not perform any real-time experiments to validate this claim.
However, the metrics used for evaluation of the proposed
system are inappropriate for unbalanced datasets.
Blacklist dependent phishing URL detection techniques can
be defeated by phishers by simply launching new websites
after short windows of time. Ma et. al., [43], addressed this
issue by proposing a URL classification technique that makes
use of a wide variety of features: lexical, host-based, blacklist-
based and WHOIS properties. Although the authors used
a relatively small dataset, they addressed the data diversity
and generalization issue by creating multiple datasets using
different publicly available sources. Other important attributes
that stand out are: feature selection and comparison, classifier
comparison, and error analysis. However, the small and rela-
tively balanced dataset is a serious limitation. Moreover, the
active attacker issue was not considered directly.
Novel distance-based features for phishing URLs based
on Kullback-Leibler divergence (described in [91] to mea-
sure the distance between distributions of normalized char-
acter frequencies in URLs and Standard English) and
Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance (measured using the two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic [92] calculated from
the distribution of character frequencies of the URLs versus
that of standard English.) were used in [21], along with
modifications of some old features to make them more robust,
e.g., the ratio of URL domain to URL length was used instead
of just URL length. Phishing detection at URL level, along
with fast data structures used by the researchers, ensures a
fast and lightweight approach capable of handling attacks
launched within short time windows. The authors used four
different datasets collected from different real-world sources13
for evaluation, thus ensuring a diverse set of URLs. They also
performed experiments to explicitly verify dataset diversity
along with a cross-dataset experiment (training on one dataset
and testing on another). The system performance using five
13Two datasets from researchers in China and two from publicly available
sources - DMOZ, Alexa for legitimate and PhishTank for phishing
supervised models was evaluated using accuracy, false positive
rate, and classifier training/testing times. Thus, the system
evaluation was setup to address some of the issues of earlier
work. However, the proposed system was not evaluated using
unbalanced datasets. The authors did not comment on system
retraining for handling newer attacks.
Lee et al. [29] evaluated malicious URLs collected from
Twitter, a popular platform for sharing poisoned links. The
authors partially handled the active attacker challenge by
proposing a system that can identify correlations among URL
redirect chains. The authors trained and evaluated the proposed
system on a large dataset of malicious tweets using multiple
metrics: accuracy, AUC, false positive and negative rates. The
system was also evaluated in a real-time environment using
a sliding window to vary the span of the training data feed.
The authors also studied feature importance using F1-scores.
However, while classification time per URL is reported, the
training time is not specified.
We conclude this section with lessons learned and best
practices based on our review of the literature.
G. Lessons learned and best practices
We observed a number of useful practices in the literature
as well as possibilities for improving future research. Use of
techniques capable of handling data availability issues while
providing reliable performance [80] is a desirable practice.
Also, the use of cost-sensitive metrics [29], [80], which
take into account the class-imbalance issue, is an important
criterion for evaluation. Generalization experiments, or cross-
domain testing of systems, is another recommended way for
verifying the performance of the model on various types of
attacks. We observed generalization experiments in a few
papers,e.g., [22], [35]. While a number of papers evaluated
on unbalanced datasets [35], [41], [45], [80], we did not find
any paper with the appropriate metrics (suggested in [26]) to
measure performance.
Feature selection can make a system faster and robust.
Popular techniques for feature selection include information
gain, F1-scores, etc. Phishing URL detection papers that used
information gain include [30], [35], [67], whereas [29], [60]
used F1-scores to determine feature importance. Other papers
that analyze feature importance include [79], [59], [41], [77].
VII. PHISHING WEBSITE DETECTION
For phishing website detection, we review 67 papers based
on the selection criteria in Section II. We begin with the
structure of a website.
A. Website Structure
A website refers to a collection of formatted documents
that can be rendered and viewed using a web browser (e.g.,
Chrome, Firefox, Microsoft Edge). Websites consist of three
elements: (1) URL pattern, (2) layout and (3) link structure.
Figure 9 shows the structure and elements of a typical website.
As described in Section VI, each website needs an address
(URL) for access. The syntax of a URL and its different
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Fig. 9: Structure of a typical website along with its network
components
components were described in Section VI. Besides coming
up with a URL, the domain must be registered with the
DNS. When a user inputs the URL into a browser, it needs
the IP address of that website, which it gets from the DNS
server, to send HTTP (or HTTPS) requests. Figure 9 shows
the communications from the users’ browser to the DNS server
and the web server.
After the HTTP request, the browser receives the HTML
content of the website. The layout refers to the syntactic
structure of the web page, i.e., the distribution of HTML
elements. Website designers generally use the same layout for
web pages with similar functionalities. Thus, users can easily
identify the purpose of a web page by looking at its design.
This can be a good source of features for detecting similarity
between the websites since phishing websites try to mimic
well-known target websites. Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) and
JavaScript are the most common ways of specifying the layout.
CSS is used to describe the position and other appearance
properties of objects in the websites. JavaScript enables the
content of a web page to dynamically change on the client
side.
Each web page usually links to other web pages for easy
navigation. These links may or may not be in the same domain
as the original web page (Section VI). Popular websites have
lots of incoming links from other websites, whereas phishing
websites do not, since they are short-lived. Web page rankings
(e.g., PageRank) by search engines can be used to measure
the importance of web pages. These rankings are based on the
page attributes including the link structure.
The following components of a website can be used as
features to characterize it:
• Network: We discussed above the syntactic features that
are directly extracted from the URL. Here, we include
other features, which are indirectly related to the URL
(e.g., DNS information, domain registration, and Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) certificate attributes).
• HTML content: This includes features that are extracted
from the HTML content of the website. Examples are:
number of links, webpage content, tags, and number of
hidden elements.
• JavaScript: Although Javascript features can be viewed as
HTML features, we put them in a separate group because
of their dynamic nature.
In the next section, we discuss the features used in the
reviewed literature, with the above taxonomy.
B. Feature Extraction and Analysis
Table VIII shows the features used in the studied phishing
website detection literature.14 These features can improve de-
tection performance. However, they also increase the training
and classification times since most of them need moderate or
high extraction and processing times. Feature size for most of
the website features is small except for Term Frequency, which
depends on the size of the vocabulary. We emphasize that
training of models require large-scale feature extraction, but
for some of the website features, this may not be possible. For
example, retrieving the WHOIS information involves sending
requests to a WHOIS server which may start rejecting requests
due to a rate-limiting policy.
There are several hard to evade website features - Visual
similarity of websites is one such feature, because if a website
is not visually similar to the target website, then the victim
will not fall for it. Another example is login-form identity.
The phisher can manipulate this feature by removing the login
fields, but this would defeat the main purpose of a phishing
attack, which is to steal credentials. In Table A11 under the
Appendix, we list the features along with citations to the
papers that use them.
In the next section, we discuss the different phishing detec-
tion methods that use the aforementioned features.
C. Detection Methods
Figure 10 shows the different methods used in the phishing
website detection literature as well as the number of papers
that use each method. Supervised techniques – Support Vector
Machines (SVM), logistic regression, decision tree, and Naïve
Bayes – are the most popular phishing website detection
methods. Only five papers use unsupervised and rule-based
methods. In contrast to phishing URL detection methods,
we see that online learning and deep learning techniques
are missing in phishing website detection. More detailed
information about the detection methods used in each paper
is in the Appendix (Table A5).
While supervised learning is the preferred choice, such
algorithms need a sizable ground truth or labeled data for
training. Hence, we next describe the different datasets used
in the phishing website detection literature.
D. Dataset Properties
Although the detection method is an important part of a
proposed system, datasets that authors use to train and test
their models have a significant effect on the trustworthiness
of their models.
1) Dataset sources and availability: Phishing website
detection techniques have used almost the same datasets as
phishing URL detection techniques, thus also exhibiting the
lack of diversity issue. Although the papers are about phishing
website detection, occasionally they use Malware and Spam
websites to test/train their methods. Such papers are grouped
together in the Malicious group (spam dataset refers to URLs
14To avoid repeating URL features, we have added them to Table I in the
previous section.
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TABLE VIII: Features used in phishing website detection. For uncommon features, we cite the paper that best describes it.
HTML Criteria Network Criteria Javascript CriteriaFS PT FS PT FS PT
# of various tag types M M Domain registration info S H keywords to words ratio S H
HTML tag attributes M M Registrar ID S M # of suspicious strings [93] S M
Term Frequency L S # of Nameservers S M # of long strings (>40, >51) S M
# of elements out of place S M DNS record S M decoding routines S H
# of small/hidden elements S M # of DNS queries S H shellcode detection S H
# of suspicious elements S M HTTP header fields M M # of iframe strings S M
# of internal/external links S M Alexa rank S M # of DOM modifying functions S H
NULL links on
site and footer S M Gmail reputation [94] S M # of event attachment S H
More than one
head tag/document S M # of bytes/packets trans. S H # of suspicious objects [93] S M
invisible frames [95] S M Fake HTTP protocol S M # of scripts S M
# of specific file type S M # of IP/port uponcomplete download S H
# of functions (eval,
setInterval, OnMouseOver...) S M
Visual [96] M H SSL Cert. attributes S M
# of iframes S M
DOM-tree [97] S H
ActiveX function S M
Right click disabled S M
Server Form Handler S M
Login-form identity S M
External term frequency [98] L H
extracted from the body of spam emails). Tables IX and X list
the papers that use phishing and malicious sources along with
the legitimate ones. Papers in which researchers used their
own data sources under are in Author’s column. If they reveal
the details of their sources publicly, they are listed as Author’s
public, otherwise as Author’s private.
Figures 11 and 12 show the distribution of phishing and
legitimate sources respectively. They show similar trends as
we saw before in phishing URL detection (Figures 6 and 7).
For the phishing dataset, 69% of the studies used PhishTank
as their source of data and 9% used Millersmiles and 6%
used APWG. For legitimate datasets, the sources are more
diverse than phishing ones. Alexa (28%) is the most widely
used dataset, but DMOZ (12%) and Yahoo Directory (20%)
are also used in several studies (unfortunately, they are now
deprecated).
2) Dataset Size: Table XI shows the categorized sizes of
the legitimate, phishing, or malicious website datasets used by
each reviewed phishing website detection paper. We observe
that more than 60% of the research papers report experiments
on balanced datasets (red cells along the diagonal line of
Table XI). These systems do not consider the base-rate fallacy
in their evaluation, hence their methods may perform quite
differently in the real world. Also, only about one-third of
the reviewed papers used at least 10,000 legitimate, phishing
and/or malicious websites for evaluation. The rest suffer from
the small dataset concern (eight papers do not mention their
dataset sizes). More details on the sizes of datasets used by
each paper can be found in the Appendix (Table A8).
3) Dataset Diversity: As in the URL section, we analyze
the diversity of PhishTank, OpenPhish, APWG, and Alexa,
since these are also the most widely used sources for websites.
However, instead of checking the diversity of URLs, we ana-
lyze the diversity found in the websites’ content. We extracted
all the text from the HTML body using the Python library
called Beautiful Soup15 to compare the websites’ content.
15https://www.crummy.com/software/BeautifulSoup/bs4/doc/
Fig. 10: Algorithms used in phishing website detection. The number of papers using the method is in parentheses.
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TABLE IX: Legitimate and phishing website datasets: sources and availability
Phish
Legit. DMOZ
(dep)
Alexa
(pub)
Yahoo Dir.
(pub)
Twitter
(pub)
Author’s Misc.a
(pub) N/Apublic private
PhishTank (pub) [88], [99]–[105] [105]–[120][99], [103]
[99], [106], [107]
[100], [121]–[128] [129] [113], [130] [131]–[138]
[99], [121]
[97], [98] [139]–[144]
APWGb(pub) [104] [129] [140], [141]
UAB Phishing (pvt) [145]–[147]
Millersmiles (pub) [99], [114] [99], [125]–[127] [130] [99]
Twitter (pub) [129], [148]
Author’s (pvt) [94], [149]–[152]
Miscellaneousc(pub) [111], [119] [153] [154], [155]
a Intelsecurity.com (defunct) [98], UCI repository [154], [155], TrendMicro [121], Google Safe Browsing [99], URoulette [97]
b Anti-Phishing Working Group
c OpenPhish [153], UCI repository [154]
TABLE X: Legitimate and malicious website datasets: sources
and availability
Malicious
Legit. DMOZ
(dep)
Alexa
(pub)
Yahoo
(pub)
Twitter
(pub)
Author
(pvt)
DNS-BlackHole
(pub)
[100]
[104] [110] [100]
Author’s (pub) [156]
Author’s (pvt) [93] [129][96]
[157]
[158]
Misc.a(pub) [100] [112] [100], [122] [95]
a Wepawet [93], MalwareURL [112], host-files.net [112], stopbadware.org [95],
jwSpamSpy [100] and webspam-uk07 [122]
Fig. 11: Distribution of papers based on legitimate website
source
We also added a filter to remove all stopwords. Another
preprocessing step is the removal of all the dead and non-
English links. Then we converted them into vectors using the
TFIDF representation. After converting each website into a
vector, we use Cosine Similarity to measure the similarity
between websites.
After preprocessing, we ended up with 5,751, 1,665, 1861
and 63,670 URLs for PhishTank, OpenPhish, APWG, and
Alexa, respectively. Table XII shows the percentage of datasets
with a specific range of similarities. For example, column
“0-10” shows the fraction of each dataset that has cosine
similarity values in the 0% to 10% range. The results showed
that all four datasets except APWG are diverse from a website
content point of view (1.3% of websites had more than 50%
similarity for PhishTank and Alexa, and 6.2% for OpenPhish,
compared to 21.6% for APWG).
4) Recency of data collection: Table XIII describes the
recency of the dataset collection time with respect to the
Fig. 12: Distribution of papers based on phishing website
source
TABLE XI: Size ranges of legitimate/phishing website
datasets.
Type Legitimate
Phishing 100s 1,000s 10,000s 100,000s >1M N/A
100s 6 5
1,000s 4 13 2 2 4
10,000s 7 1 1 3
100,000s 1 1
N/A 1 13
paper’s publication date. Unfortunately, only a few papers
mentioned the time period during which their datasets were
collected (25 out of 67). The importance of features may
change over time, some features which were not important
during the past year may now be useful, or the other way
around. The use of newer data for evaluation also captures the
capacity of a system to detect the latest attacks. Among the
papers that mentioned the recency, a majority of the work is
published less than a year after data collection.
There are only a handful of research methods that propose
real-time website-based detection systems [118], [129], [148].
Feature extraction time is a major obstacle for real-time
website-based detection systems since they must extract the
content from the website.
E. Evaluation Metrics
As mentioned in Section VI-E, evaluation metrics should
be chosen carefully when the dataset is unbalanced. We only
found two papers that use a metric specifically suited to
unbalanced datasets (MCC) [136], [155]; the rest reported
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TABLE XII: Percentage of websites with different ranges of
similarities in each dataset. Columns specify the ranges of the
Cosine Similarity in percentage.
Dataset Ranges[0-10] (10-20] (20-30] (30-40] (40-50] >50
APWG 72.78 3.0 0.68 0.64 0.33 21.59
OpenPhish 77.27 11.28 1.32 0.29 0.46 6.26
PhishTank 81.59 13.55 2.21 0.81 0.5 1.31
Alexa 86.06 10.34 1.55 0.48 0.21 1.32
TABLE XIII: Recency of website datasets used in evaluation.
Papers in bold use data collected from multiple periods.
Recency in year(s) N Literature
Real time 3 [118], [129], [148]
1 17 [98], [102], [106], [155]–[157], [121][94], [99], [105], [132], [145]–[149], [151]
2-3 2 [121], [135]
3-4 4 [104], [123], [140], [142]
commonly used metrics, which are more suitable for balanced
datasets. Among these two papers, only [136] actually used
an unbalanced dataset.
Table XIV lists the metrics used for evaluating proposed
methods in the literature. It only includes the papers that
used up to two metrics (seven of 67 papers do not mention
metrics). For the complete list of papers and their metrics refer
to Table A2 in the Appendix.
TABLE XIV: Distribution of evaluation metrics in phishing
website detection.
Acc PRF ErR CMx AUC Othera
Acc 4 3 3 9
PRF 5 1 2 1
ErR 9 2
CMx 11
AUC 1
Other 2
a MCscore and Kappa statistic
As shown in Table XIV, Confusion Matrix is the most used
metric in the literature. The Error Rate and PRF (Precision,
Recall and F1-score) are also popular among researchers, even
though they are not appropriate metrics, when the dataset is
unbalanced since they depend upon which class is considered
positive. Among the reported metrics, AUC and Confusion
Matrix (we can calculate all other metrics from the matrix)
are better choices. Of the papers that use an unbalanced
dataset, several did not use the appropriate metrics [93], [104],
[118], [123], [125], [136], [148], [157]. The following nine
reported the Confusion Matrix [88], [93], [94], [119], [121],
[122], [130], [132], [156]. One reported AUC [104], and three
reported both AUC and Confusion Matrix [98], [107], [113].
F. Selected Phishing Website Detection Literature
Next, we present a detailed analysis of the reviewed liter-
ature that addressed one or more of the challenges described
in Section IV.
Using unbalanced dataset is important because of the base-
rate fallacy challenge. While many papers [78], [98], [102],
[121], [130], [156] used unbalanced datasets, papers [96],
[129] addressed this issue differently. Researchers in [96]
evaluated their algorithm by changing the ratio of malicious-
to-benign examples (1:2, 1:5, 1:10, 1:15 and 1:20). The
results show that both precision (97.6% to 94.2%) and recall
(96.6% to 81.6%) decrease with an increase in the number of
legitimate websites i.e., performance drops with increase in
degree of imbalance. The malicious links in the dataset were
collected only from spam emails, thus making it less diverse.
They also did not mention the time period of the dataset they
collected to train and test their method. Researchers in [129]
also observed similar results by changing the non-spam to
spam ratios (1:1, 1:4, and 1:10).
A robust detection system should be able to thwart zero-day
attacks (an attack that occurs on the same day a vulnerability is
discovered) – thus, testing a system in a real-time environment
is indispensable. The authors in [129] proposed ‘Monarch’ as
a live phishing website detection system that uses a Logis-
tic Regression classifier trained offline using blacklists and
annotation schemes – the ground truth. The system’s training
URLs were aggregated from two streams: links in emails from
a mail service provider as well as shared on Twitter. These two
sources capture a widely different set of features in terms of
lexical properties of URLs, hosting infrastructure, and page
content (HTML and links). The training setup was done using
varying ratios (1:1, 1:4, 1:10) of non-spam to spam (links
caught using spam traps and/or blacklists were marked as
spam, rest were labeled as non-spam). The system was tested
in real-time using links extracted from the same two sources.
The system was tested on 15 million URLs/day with classifier
retraining every 4 days. However, the authors do not clearly
discuss the ratio of spam and non-spam in their testing data
stream. They note the deficiencies in their ground truth data -
but do not provide any ideas for improvement.
The active attacker poses a critical threat to phishing website
detection systems. The framework proposed in [156] analyzed
the possible interaction between attacker (evasion) and de-
fender (counter-evasion). They demonstrated that an active
attacker can evade machine learning based detection models
(J48 classifier trained on 124 application/network-layer fea-
tures) by manipulating the features of the malicious website.
Their results validated that the proposed active method can
increase the false negative rate to 89.1% by only changing
5% of features on average. They also showed that proactive
training can reduce the success rate of the attacker. The authors
also claimed that their method can make the decision for a
given website after a few seconds but they did not report the
classification time specifically.
Periodic system retraining is another way to identify newer
types of attacks (active attacker challenge). Researchers in
[94] used a model trained (with daily retraining) on Google’s
phishing blacklist to update the blacklist automatically. The
authors addressed multiple goals in their paper, decreasing
false positives while increasing recall, handling noise in
training data (inaccurate labels), and decreasing the detection
latency (to smoothly process millions of web pages every day).
They achieved the low latency goal by creating a pipeline
system which tries to drop obvious non-phishing websites
during the early stages. Their pipeline starts with extracting
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lightweight URL features followed by the content and hosting
features. They use a novel machine learning algorithm similar
to Random Forest and online learning algorithms for their
system. Their model achieved 90% precision with only 0.1%
false positive rate on a testing data of 75 million URLs
collected over two weeks. However, the authors do not share
details about the steps they took to overcome the dataset’s
noise.
Marchal et al. [98] addressed three security challenges in
their method: the base-rate fallacy, lack of data availability, and
active attackers. They proposed a phishing detection system
that uses a relatively small training data (1036 phishing and
4531 legitimate) and tested on 101,553 websites (100,000
legitimate and 1553 phishing). The system uses features that
cannot be fully manipulated by the attacker (reinforcement
against active attackers) divided into four categories based on
whether the attacker has full or partial control on the feature.
For example, distribution of the terms in external links of
a phishing website is completely out of the control of the
attacker. Their method had a 99% AUC and less than 1%
false positive rate using more than 200 features. They further
grouped the features into five different categories (URL, term
usage, starting and landing main level domain, registered
domain name usage, and webpage content) and tested the
effectiveness of each of them separately. Based on their results,
URL features contributed the most (0.88 F1-score) compared
to others. Additionally, their method is language independent
and was tested on a dataset of six different languages (German,
English, French, Portuguese, Italian, and Spanish) to show
that the performance is similar for websites with different
languages. However, they did not report the training and
detection times of their system.
Applying machine learning techniques on extracted features
from different sections of the website (URLs, HTML content,
domains, etc.) is not enough to distinguish legitimate websites
from their phishing counterparts. Using the user’s interactions
with websites, SpiderWeb [157] builds a graph from the
redirect chain of the websites and distinguishes legitimate and
malicious websites by defining a threshold. Since the redirect
chains are collected from a diverse set of web users, the
attacker needs to make the redirect chain of the malicious
website similar to legitimate websites to evade detection. This
can only be done by exposing the malicious website to a
larger audience which increases the chance of getting caught.
The main limitation of this work lies in the complexity of
redirection chains - it requires a minimum number of different
redirect chains (visits from different users) that lead to the
same website to make a decision. They did an experiment with
10,914 users and found that their system detected the phishing
websites after 723 users got compromised (93% successfully
blocked).
Among all the systems reviewed here, none addressed all
of the security challenges. The closest system [98] addressed
three out of all the challenges mentioned in Section IV.
A more thorough system is required to fill this gap. As a
starting point for a better system, we should extract the best
practices from existing works. Before moving to phishing
email detection techniques, we summarize the lessons learned
and best practices of phishing website detection techniques
based on our review of the literature.
G. Lessons learned and best practices
Among the systems that used a large and unbalanced dataset
in their training and testing phases, we realized that ensemble
methods (bagging or boosting) are the best fit. They resulted
in detection rates as high as 99% and error rates of less than
1%. DMOZ and Phishtank are the main datasets used in these
systems as well as the author collected datasets. This can
be seen as evidence that researchers should focus more on
ensemble methods [159].
Using relatively diverse dataset can make the model more
robust and general. There are several works that used Alexa as
their source for legitimate websites. Although Alexa’s list of
top websites is diverse in term of having different categories
of websites, it only contains domain names. So, there is a clear
distinction between legitimate and phishing websites. One way
to remove this bias is to use Alexa’s list as a basis for crawling
[93] and use crawled websites as a dataset.
VIII. PHISHING/SPEAR PHISHING EMAIL DETECTION
Email is a popular vector of phishing and spear phishing
attacks. Thus, detection of these attacks is critical. In this
section, we review 37 phishing and eight spear phishing email
detection papers.
A. Email Structure
An email consists of two main parts: Header fields (abbr.
Header), and a Body, which is optional.16 Simple Mail
Transfer Protocol or SMTP17 is the Transmission Control Pro-
tocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) protocol used in sending and
receiving emails. Originally, emails were only able to handle
plain text messages. Multi-Purpose Internet Mail Extensions
(MIME)18 supported new file types like JPEG and HTML.
The Header is a sequence of lines that are composed of a
field name, followed by a colon (“:”), then some information,
and ends with a newline (Example VIII.1). Though mostly
hidden from the reader, the header is very important since
it contains sender’s and recipients’ information, an optional
message-ID field, and the route (hops and SMTP relays) taken
by the email. Authentication-results is an important header
field for spam and phishing detection and displays the results
of authentication protocols such as Sender Policy Framework
(SPF). SPF is an open standard specifying a method to prevent
sender address forgery.19 Another widely used protocol is
DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) for email integrity.20
The email body is optional and usually contains greetings,
the actual message, and a possible signature field. It also
includes images and other types of attachments. The MIME
extension enabled the body to be coded with non-ASCII
16https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2822
17https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5321
18https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2049
19http://www.openspf.org/Introduction
20http://www.dkim.org/
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elements like HTML or Base64. An email body formatted
with MIME content has a MIME-Version field in the header.
The header and body are the main parts for extracting
features from an email, so we refer to them as Header and
Body Features respectively. We describe the different types
of features used in email detection research in the next
section. We present the other types of features (External and
Attachment related) and the papers that use them respectively
in Appendix Table A12.
Example VIII.1: Example of a phishing email header
From: onlinebanking@regions.com Fri Nov 23 11:01:49 2007
Return-Path: <onlinebanking@regions.com>
X-Original-To: jose@login.monkey.org
Delivered-To: jose@login.monkey.org
Received: from mail1.monkey.org (spammy.monkey.org [152.160.49.220])
by funky.monkey.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1577F469B2 for
<jose@login.monkey.org>; Fri, 23 Nov 2007 11:01:49 -0500 (EST)
Received: from mail2.monkey.org (mail2.monkey.org [204.181.64.8])
by mail1.monkey.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 06788131FF92
for <jose@monkey.org>; Fri, 23 Nov 2007 11:01:49 -0500 (EST)
Received: from 80.216.6.214 by ; Fri, 23 Nov 2007 10:59:28 -0600
Message-ID: <200710511.012001@mail.monkey.org>
Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2007 11:01:47 -0500 (EST)
From: onlinebanking@regions.com
To: undisclosed-recipients:;
Content-Length: 0
B. Email Feature Extraction and Analysis
Header features: The research literature focuses on sender
related fields – e.g., From, Sender, Mail From, Reply-to, etc.,
– especially the Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) in
those entries and verifying their consistency throughout the
header. The FQDN is the complete domain name for a specific
host on the internet.21 It is made of the hostname and domain
name. In the following example: “mymail.somecollege.edu",
the hostname is mymail, and the domain is somecollege.edu.
To illustrate, an email supposedly from Amazon should not
have a Reply-to entry with an Outlook domain name. However,
we caution that the sender can spoof all the header fields
pertaining to sender domain and email address. The Subject
is commonly analyzed (Table A12), it being an important
lure used by phishers. So researchers use different types of
lexical analysis relying on Natural Language Processing (NLP)
techniques to extract features and search for blacklisted words.
Another interesting field is the Received field. It allows emails
to be tracked down because every hop the emails passes
through will register its own entry (specifying the domains
of the sending and receiving hosts, timestamp, etc.) [160]. An
email received from a coworker in the same building using the
company’s mailing server should not be coming from a host
in another country.
Body features: Researchers use lexical analysis to detect
common phrasing patterns or words, e.g., Click here, Urgent,
Warning, Account closure notice, etc. NLP techniques [161]
were used to design: 1) Semantic features e.g., detecting
language that elicits urgency or threat [162]. 2) Stylometric
features e.g., detecting writing habits and profiling users [163],
21https://kb.iu.edu/d/aiuv
[164]. Researchers also extract important features from URLs
included in the email body (as covered in Section VI).
In Table XV, we list the various features that appeared
in phishing email detection research papers, as well as their
size and required processing time. URL features have longer
extraction times (as seen in Section VI-B) compared to “shal-
low” lexical features (e.g., word frequencies) extracted from
the body. The size of most email features is relatively small,
except for features that rely on the vocabulary of the whole
dataset like TFIDF [27]. Weighing the features with algorithms
like Information Gain (IG) makes it possible to get subsets of
features that give better classification results [165]–[171].
C. Detection Methods
Figure 13 shows the classification and clustering methods
used in the phishing email detection literature and the number
of papers that employed them. It shows a preference for
Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Random Forest (RF).
The number of research papers using supervised algorithms is
higher than the number using unsupervised algorithms. More
details and information about the methods used by each paper
can be found in Table A6 in the appendix. As previously
mentioned in Section VII-C, the lack of diverse and new
datasets gives a false impression or interpretation of supervised
classifiers’ results. Some researchers have tackled the lack of
labeled datasets by using unsupervised algorithms to cluster
or create profiles of users’ writing habits [163], [164].
D. Dataset properties
1) Dataset sources and availability: We describe the differ-
ent dataset sources used in phishing email detection literature
in Table XVI. Figures 14 and 15 show the distribution of these
sources. It is clear that the most popular datasets for phish-
ing and legitimate emails are Nazario22 and SpamAssassin23
respectively. We also include sources for malware, spam, and
spear phishing datasets in Table XVI.
Researchers need to be aware that publicly available datasets
can be sanitized. For example, the Enron dataset24 and the
SpamAssassin dataset have some obfuscated addresses and
domains. Moreover, many of the emails in the Enron dataset
only have partial headers (missing a number of fields) instead
of full headers.
An increasing number of authors used their own private
datasets or worked with companies to get their email logs and
archives. It has the benefit of training and testing models on
realistic and relatively new emails. However, it raises the issue
of reproducibility and comparisons of systems. Although the
objective is to release a new system with a high detection rate,
it would also help the field of research if authors shared new
datasets. That being said, we are aware of issues related to
sensitive information and realize that sharing can be difficult.
22https://monkey.org/~jose/phishing/
23http://www.csmining.org/index.php/spam-assassin-datasets.html
24https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~enron/
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TABLE XV: Features used in phishing email detection. For uncommon features, we cite the paper that best describes it.
Body Criteria Header CriteriaFS PT FS PT
Lexical Features (# of words, # of characters,
Function words, Tokensa, Regular expressions, etc.) M M “Message-Id” S S
Style metrics (number of paragraphs in the email, Yule metric, etc.) S S “Received” Fields S S
Topic in the bodyb S S “From” S S
Latent Semantic Indexingc S S “Mail from” S S
Readability indexesd S S “Sender” S S
NLP (Part-of-Speech tags, Named entities,
Wordnet properties, etc.) M S “Mail-to” S S
Semantic Network Analysise S H “Delivered To” S S
Vocabulary Richnessf S M Authentication-Results (SPF, DKIM, etc.) S S
Urgency, reward, threat language in the body S S “Subject” features (length of subject, # of words,# of characters, vocabulary richness, etc.) S S
Greeting, signature, farewell in the message S S Blacklisted words in “Subject” S S
Presence of both “From:” & “To:” in email body S S # of words and/or characters in the “Send” field S S
# of linked to domains S S “Sender” domain , “Reply-to” domain S S
URL features M M “Sender” domain , “Message-Id” domain S S
HTML features M S “Sender” / “From” , email’s modal domains S S
Presence and/or # of forms in email body S S Timestamp, “Sent date” S S
Blacklisted words in the message M M Source IP, Autonomous System Number S M
Scripts/JavaScripts features in email body M S “Subject”: Fwd, Reply S S
# of onClick events in email body S S Interaction habitsg S M
Feature from images/logos in the message S S “Cc”, “BCc” fields S S
Mention of the sender S S “X-Mailer” S S
# of links & images links in email body S S “X-Originating-IP” S S
# of tables in email body S S “X-Originating-hostname” S S
Recipient’s email address in email body S S “X-spam-flag’ S S
Phishing terms weighth L M “X-virus-scanned’ S S
TFIDF L S
Email size S S
# of email body parts S S
MIME Version or Content-Typei S S
JavaScript PopUp Windows S S
Link displayed , Link in destination S M
Img links , spoofed target address S M
Hidden text in the email, Salting techniquesj S S
# of internal/xxternal links S S
a Semantic relations can also be used to add tokens
b Words that tend to appear together in emails [172]
c Statistical technique for the analysis of two-mode and co-occurrence data.
d quantitative description of the text writing and organisation style [173].
e Use Semantic Network Analysis to extract and create the feature vector as explained in [174]
f The ratio of the number of words to the number of characters in the document. [170]
g User’s history of conversations and list of contacts [163]
h Terms that have the highest term frequency in the phishing dataset [171].
i Multipart/Alternative, text/plain, text/html
j Adding or distorting content not perceivable by the reader [175]
Fig. 13: Algorithms used in phishing email detection. The number of papers using the method is in parentheses.
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TABLE XVI: Legitimate and phishing email datasets: sources and availability
Phish
Legit. SpamAssassin
(pub)
Enron
(pub)
Author’s
(pvt) Misc
a N/A
Nazario (pub) [165]–[172], [176]–[181] [161] [162], [168]
APWG (pub) [174]
Author’s (pvt) [168] [163] [163], [175], [182]–[188]
Miscellaneousb [189], [190] [191] [192]–[194]
Malware/Spam
Author’s (pvt) [163] [163], [175], [188]
Miscellaneousc [191]
Spear Phishing
Author’s (pvt) [163] [163], [164], [173], [195]
UCI repo [196], [197]
N/A [198]
a Authors gathering emails from various sources like companies, Phishery (dead source) TREC [191]
b Major Australian Bank [192]–[194], PhishingCorpus [189], [190], SPAM Archive [190]
Fig. 14: Distribution of papers based on legitimate email
source
Fig. 15: Distribution of papers based on phishing email source
2) Dataset Size: As mentioned above, the ratio of benign
to malicious samples in phishing detection is very important.
Therefore, we report the number of the papers that used
different combinations of dataset sizes in Table XVII. It also
shows the sizes of the phishing and legitimate dataset sizes
that are commonly used together. We notice from this table
that most authors use relatively balanced ratios (e.g., 4 to
6 or 4.5 to 5.5). Examples of research in the literature that
used unbalanced datasets with different ratios are [161], [165],
[167], [169], [175].
3) Dataset Diversity: Another concern is the dataset diver-
sity. Therefore, we analyze the email body content diversity
of the most used datasets: SpamAssassin, Enron, and Nazario.
With this aim, we extract all the text from the email body
then we remove all the HTML tags, CSS, and header of
the emails. We also filter out all stop words to remove
uninformative words. Then we convert the extracted text
into vectors using TFIDF representation. The SpamAssassin
dataset includes both spam and ham emails. The Inverse
Document Frequency was computed using all the emails. After
getting the vectors, we use Cosine Similarity (Equation (9))
to measure the similarities. The Dataset sizes were 10,745
for SpamAssassin, 156,070 for Enron (Sent folder), and 8,551
for Nazario. Table XVIII shows the percentage of datasets
with a specific range of similarities It shows that the datasets
have diverse email body content: 90.91% of emails in Nazario
dataset and more than 97% in SpamAssassin and Enron
datasets have less than 10% similarity.
TABLE XVII: Size ranges of phishing/legitimate email
datasets.
Type Legitimate
Phishing 100s 1,000s 10,000s 100,000s N/A
100s 5 5
1,000s 9 4 7
10,000s 1 2
N/A 2 1 1
TABLE XVIII: Percentage of emails with different ranges of
similarities in each dataset. Columns specify the ranges of the
Cosine Similarity in percentage.
Dataset Ranges[0-10] (10-20] (20-30] (30-40] (40-50] >50
SAa 98.15 1.45 0.24 0.061 0.02 0.04
Nazario 90.91 6.60 1.32 0.53 0.26 0.33
Enron 97.16 2.56 0.18 0.04 0.01 0.02
a SA - Spam Assassin
4) Recency of data collection: Nazario, SpamAssassin,
Enron, and UCI datasets are made of old emails (early 2000s),
except for Nazario who released new emails annually from
2015-17. This could explain why some authors prefer to
rely on private sources, e.g., personal emails or companies’
datasets. Table XIX describes the recency of the datasets in
relation to the papers’ publication dates. From the table, we
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conclude that almost 70% of the papers used old datasets.
Thus, we recommend using recent sources of emails if possi-
ble. For example, the Wikileaks website holds archives with
thousands of recent legitimate emails from varied sources
e.g., Clinton emails, Hacking Team, Sony, etc. An interesting
source for phishing emails are Phishbowls, which are a fre-
quently updated collection of emails with full or partial header
maintained by universities e.g., Cornell IT Phishbowl.25 We
refer to [90] where the authors built a dataset with emails from
Wikileaks archives and Phishbowls from different universities.
TABLE XIX: Recency of email datasets used in evaluation.
Papers in bold use data collected from multiple periods.
Recency in year(s) N Literature
Real time 3 [164], [199] [195]
1 5 [168], [176] [174], [182], [193]
2-3 5 [172], [175], [191] [181], [186]
3-4 7 [169], [178] [194][173] [170], [181], [186]
≥ 4 26
[167], [177], [179], [180]
[162], [163], [165], [166], [171], [184]
[161], [188]–[190], [192], [196], [197]
[168]–[170], [173], [178], [186], [195]
[176], [181]
E. Evaluation Metrics
We list in Table XX the metrics and the number of papers
that used up to two of these metrics in their evaluations.
Information about papers that cover more than two metrics
can be found in Table A3 of the Appendix. We note that 7
papers out of 37 did not mention the metrics they used. The
most common evaluation metrics used in the phishing email
detection literature are Accuracy (Acc), Precision, Recall,
and F1-score (PRF), and the confusion matrix (CMx). As
mentioned before, Precision, Recall, F1-score and Accuracy
are unsuitable for evaluating unbalanced datasets. Hence we
recommend the use of metrics like AUC and the confusion
matrix values instead.
In the surveyed phishing email detection literature, only one
paper used G-mean [188], 13 reported the confusion matrix,
and seven reported AUC.
F. Selected Email Detection Literature
We now take a deeper look at the phishing email detection
literature that addressed at least some of the security chal-
25https://it.cornell.edu/phish-bowl
TABLE XX: Distribution of evaluation metrics in phishing
email detection.
Acc PRF ErR CMx AUC Othera
Acc 14 4 1 3 3 2
PRF 14 1 8 4 1
ErR 2 1
CMx 14 3 1
AUC 7 1
Othera 4
a One-Error, Coverage and Average Precision [193], G-
Mean [188], Rand Index (RI) [192], Root Mean Square
Error (RMSE) [180]
lenges mentioned in Section V-A. Then we summarize the
lessons learned and recommend some good practices.
In a realistic phishing scenario, the number of phishing
emails is considerably lower than legitimate ones. Therefore,
the base-rate fallacy is a critical issue that needs to be
considered. We notice that researchers stopped using a 1:1
ratio. However, the ratios used are still not realistic. We cite for
example [167], where the authors used a dataset made of 4,150
legitimate and 2,687 phishing emails from SpamAssassin and
Nazario respectively. Masoumeh et al. [166] relied on the
same sources but used different ratios: 1,700 ham and 1,000
phishing emails. An instance of a realistic ratio is [175], where
the authors collected 36,364 ham emails and 3,636 phishing
emails from private sources.
The lack of new datasets is an important security challenge.
As we concluded previously from Table XIX, researchers still
employ old data. If we consider the evolution of phishing
attacks, then using emails from old sources to train and test
classifiers is a problem. Authors who work with companies use
their private email logs collected from recent months or years
for their research. An example of such papers is [193] where
the authors gathered 2,048 phishing emails from an Australian
bank in the span of 5 months. Another example would be [168]
where the authors collected from their own private server 2,000
legitimate and 300 phishing emails in the same year the paper
was published. We also cite [182] where the authors collected
1,492 (986 legitimate 506 phishing) emails in the span of
3 months, almost a year before the paper was published.
However, the use of private datasets exacerbates the problem
of comparing systems.
Testing the robustness of the phishing email detection
system is a good prevention mechanism against the active at-
tacker. Authors test for robustness in different ways. One way
would be to train the phishing email detector on one subset of
the dataset, but test it on another subset that was collected in a
later time span, e.g., [175]. The overall performance was a bit
lower but they still achieved an F1-score of 98.66% compared
to the original F1-score of 99.89%. The same authors also
added 20,000 emails to their dataset and considered spam and
phishing as an unwanted class, and then tested an unchanged
model. They achieve an F1-score of 99.48%. Another way
to test for robustness and how the classifier would perform
against zero-day attacks is to train the model on one dataset
and test it on emails from a different dataset. This was done,
for example, in [168]. The authors trained their classifiers on
Nazario and SpamAssassin datasets, then tested on emails
collected from their private servers. The performance only
dropped by almost 1% from 99% to 98%. Legitimate datasets
were varied in [161]. They trained only on a subset of Enron
Inbox emails and then tested on a different subset of Enron
Inbox emails as well as a subset of Enron Sent emails. A few
papers also leverage semantics to increase the robustness of
the features and increase the performance of classifiers. The
following papers [161], [162], [171], [190], [192] reported the
use of WordNet26 to enrich the textual features. Wordnet is
26https://wordnet.princeton.edu/
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a large lexical dataset for English and is used to identify the
semantic relationships of the tokens used as features.
An issue that we encountered in the reviewed literature
was the ability to perform a comparative analysis of systems.
Indeed, few researchers report the training and testing times
of their models and/or the details of the machines used to run
those models. Exceptions include [168], [175], [180].
In the next subsection, we focus on the research done in
spear phishing detection. The readers will notice that it is
shorter compared to email detection. The reason is the paucity
of research on this topic.
G. Spear phishing
Spear phishing emails are malicious emails that are targeted
towards an individual, or a specific group of people, or a
specific organization. It is called targeted because it contains
information sensitive to the intended victim. Hackers use
spear phishing attacks not only to steal money or personal
information but also to install malware or obtain credentials
of an account with higher privileges.27
Research covering spear phishing emails is still small com-
pared to research on phishing emails, URLs, and websites.
Based on the attributes mentioned in Section V-A, we analyzed
eight papers. Here, we highlight the spear phishing email lit-
erature that addressed at least some of the security challenges
mentioned in Section IV.
The base-rate fallacy is even more of an issue for spear
phishing emails since they are scarce compared to even
normal phishing emails. An example of research that used
an imbalanced dataset is Han et al. [173]. The emails were
collected from Symantec’s enterprise email scanning services
and contained 1,467 spear phishing emails from eight different
known campaigns and 14,043 benign emails collected between
2011 and 2013. Another example is Stringhini et al. [163],
where they used the Enron Corpus and three email datasets
from a large security company (that were not detected by
spam-filtering software) to collect and work on 43,274 spam,
17,473 phishing, 546 spear phishing emails. The last example
is Trang Ho et al. [195]. The authors worked on a dataset from
Lawrence Berkeley National Lab (LBNL), which consisted
of 372 million emails and event logs gathered since 2013.
The security team of LNBL and the method developed by
the researchers only discovered 21 spear phishing emails
combined. This is an example of a realistic ratio of benign
to spear phishing emails.
The time-scale of spear phishing attacks are short, thus the
need for real-time detection systems. Trang Ho et al. [195]
exploited domain and sender reputation features and created a
new anomaly detection technique. Their method scores a click-
in-email event by generating the feature vector and comparing
it with previous events using a time window (e.g., three or
six months). Their method was able to detect 17 out of 19
spear phishing campaigns in addition to two others that were
previously undetected by LBNL. Another live detection system
was made by Stringhini et al. [163]. They built a system that
27https://www.csoonline.com/article/3334617/what-is-spear-phishing-why-
targeted-email-attacks-are-so-difficult-to-stop.html
is based on senders’ writing habits. User profiles were built
using writing habits (occurrence of characters, functional and
special words, style metrics, etc.), composition and sending
habits and interaction habits (social network of the user).
After the system is trained using SVM with SMO (Sequential
Minimal Optimization), it launches an identity-verification
process when a received email is considered suspicious. Han
et al. [173] attempt to improve upon the time-consuming
task of manually analyzing datasets of emails to detect which
are spear phishing. They used a graph-based semi-supervised
learning framework to differentiate between benign, known
and unknown spear phishing campaigns. The dataset contained
sets of labeled spear phishing campaigns and unlabeled emails.
They achieved a 0.9 F1-score with a 0.01 false positive rate
in detecting spear phishing emails that belong to previously
known campaigns. However, F1-score may not be the best
metric to use for imbalanced datasets. We encourage authors
to evaluate their system using the metrics suggested in Section
VIII-E.
We summarize next the lessons learned from reviewing the
phishing and spear phishing email detection literature.
H. Lessons learned and best practices
There is still much to be done to enhance the research
practices in the phishing and spear phishing email detection
fields. Researchers should give more attention to the repro-
ducibility of their work by specifying: the architecture of the
machines that run the training and testing models; the training
and testing times; and sharing the datasets used or possible
ways to collect them (if not available already). Research
using balanced datasets is decreasing. However, the ratios of
legitimate to phishing emails used in the literature are still
not realistic. Researchers can start by using data with skewed
ratios between legitimate and malicious classes and evaluate
their systems using metrics made for unbalanced datasets. To
detect zero-day attacks and reinforce detection systems against
active attackers, more research is needed on periodic retraining
on new datasets and on real-time detection mechanisms.
IX. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
A careful review of the literature on phishing URL, website
and email detection from the security challenges perspective
reveals multiple opportunities for future contribution, which
are discussed below.
• Dataset Issues: We observe a lack of good dataset sources
and a dearth of diversity in the data used for evaluation
of detection systems. PhishTank and APWG are popular
sources of phishing URLs used in URL and website
detection; DMOZ (now deprecated) and Alexa’s list of
top websites are common sources of legitimate links.
However, Alexa only provides legitimate domain names,
which do not capture the true nature and variety of
complete URLs that a user can come across in a real-
world scenario. Only a few authors go the extra mile
to include a detailed description of how the data was
collected [200].
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Along with its diversity, recency of the data must also
be taken into account during evaluation. Newer types of
phishing URLs are submitted to crowd-sourced sites like
APWG, PhishTank. But the use of deprecated sources
such as DMOZ, Yahoo Directory, etc., renders the pro-
posed system useless to newer attacks. In email detection,
we notice a clear affinity towards using old data sources
like Nazario, SpamAssassin, and/or Enron. To ensure di-
versity, authors also use private emails or emails collected
from companies. Although, a better option (more recent
and realistic), using private sources does not help in the
clear shortage of publicly available datasets.
Another major issue observed is the availability of quality
data. Publicly available phishing URLs (PhishTank) may
have dead links, presence of duplicates, incomplete links,
etc. Organizations and individuals may encounter more
sophisticated attacks in the form of emails or websites,
which could evade detection by humans and by classifiers.
A number of papers also use phishing as well as spear
phishing emails collected by them, which are not publicly
available. Such URLs or emails are usually not submitted
to crowd-sourced sites and could represent harder to
detect attacks.
• Evaluation metrics: Use of accuracy as an evaluation
metric is not desirable. It does not capture the true
performance of the classifier in the case of unbalanced
data. Moreover, it gives a false sense of optimism (base-
rate fallacy). A better evaluation would include metrics
of performance on both classes or cost-weighted scores
of classification like Matthew’s Correlation Coefficient
(MCC) [26], balanced detection rate [90], etc. Using
appropriate metrics like MCC, balanced detection rate,
precision, recall, etc., for evaluating performance on
unbalanced datasets can also tackle the base-rate fallacy
issue.
• Retraining the systems: System retraining is important
for adapting detection models based on machine learning
methods against an active attacker. However, much of the
relevant literature does not mention the retraining of clas-
sification models trained on features extracted from older
websites, URLs, and/or emails (malicious and benign).
This is a major concern since the pre-trained detection
models are most likely to fail when phishers change
the type and nature of the malicious websites/URLs and
URLs embedded in emails, thus changing the attributes
that the classifier depends upon for its judgment. We refer
readers to papers, e.g., [28], [94], [139], which describe
techniques/periodicity for retraining.
• Generalization experiment: Common techniques for train-
ing and testing the data involve five-fold or ten-fold cross-
validation or in some cases, splitting the original dataset
into training (usually 70%-60%) and testing (usually
30%-40%) data. But in such cases, the source of the data
remains the same and the test set may have attributes
which are common to the training set – thus ensuring
better performance of the classifier. This, however, may
not be the case in a real-world scenario. Therefore a
proposed methodology should be cross-evaluated (trained
on one dataset and tested on a different dataset) on attack
types from a varied range of data sources. Deploying a
system in a real-world setup (as part of a mail server, or
web browser) also tests the system’s performance against
newer attacks.
• Supervised Machine Learning: We observed an important
gap in the detection techniques employed for malicious
URLs, websites and emails: a majority of the imple-
mentations use supervised learning methods. The major
necessity for training and evaluating the performance of
such supervised systems is the considerable amount of
labeled data. However, this brings us back to a major
security challenge – data availability.
• Evaluation times: Phishing attacks are usually launched
for a short window of time (a few days or weeks).
Therefore, for the detection of malicious websites, the
mechanism used should be fast as well as capable of
zero-day attack detection. However, only a few papers
(e.g., [22]) report run times for training the classifiers. In
our opinion, training and detection times should be em-
phasized while discussing the performance of a classifier.
X. THE WEAKEST LINK - USER STUDIES
Regardless of detectors’ performance, users play an impor-
tant role in preventing attacks, since determined attackers can
find ways to bypass detection techniques. Till date, users are
considered the most vulnerable link in the phishing ecosystem.
According to a study by Intel, 97% of people are not able to
detect phishing emails.28 There are several studies on users’
susceptibility to phishing attacks, e.g., [201], [202], and on
how to improve their knowledge about them, e.g., [203], [204].
In this section, we start with an overview of different deception
techniques used by attackers. We then systematically review
the following attributes of 63 selected studies:
• Participants and Environment: The number of partic-
ipants recruited in the study and whether they were
recruited from a specific population (e.g., university stu-
dents). Running the experiment in the lab usually forces
the researchers to reduce the number of participants, so
we also consider the environment of the study as an
attribute (Lab/Real). Researchers can ask participants to
come to the lab to do the experiment (Lab) or send them
the emails (or link to an online survey) so they can do
the experiment wherever they want (Real).
• Evaluation: The variables that were measured in the
study: detection rate, background knowledge, personality,
and cognitive process. Personality is used to distinguish
qualities or characteristics of individuals. It consists of
five major traits: Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraver-
sion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism [205]. Cognitive
process refers to four variables related to humans’ de-
cision making process: 1) neural activity: to measure
individuals effort in detection phishing attacks, 2) eye
movement: to find parts of the email/website that people
28https://www.marketwatch.com/press-release/97-of-people-globally-
unable-to-correctly-identify-phishing-emails-2015-05-12
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focus on, 3) cognitive impulsivity [206]: Tendency to act
without much thought, and 4) heuristic/systematic pro-
cessing [207]: Explains how people receive and process
a message, either by using their background knowledge
or by investigating and analyzing the message. Besides
these quantitative measures, qualitative analysis of partic-
ipants’ reasoning can be used to understand their thought
processes and performance.
• Context: Whether the study is about phishing webpages
or phishing emails.
• Experiment Design: Important aspects of the design of the
experiment. It includes: whether the experiment involves
deception (i.e., participants are not informed that the
experiment is about phishing) and whether participants’
behavior changes with time (long-term study). Design
of the questionnaire is also important, some studies
only ask participants about their vulnerabilities (Q &
A) while more complex studies show the participants
phishing/legitimate emails or webpages (experimental).
• Goal of the study: We found two different goals for user
studies on phishing attacks. 1) Detection: studying the
quantitative and qualitative performance of participants
on detecting different types of attacks. 2) Training: study-
ing the effectiveness of a training method. Although most
training studies are followed by a detection study, we
make a distinction between the pure detection studies and
training studies.
Categorizing the previous research into different groups
based on the aforementioned attributes helps us identify the
areas that are well studied and also the gaps in existing
research. After reviewing the studies based on the aforemen-
tioned attributes, we point out their strengths and weaknesses
and conclude with a discussion on the gaps in existing research
and some possible future directions.
A. Participants and Environment
Table XXI shows the number and type of participants along
with the environment of each study. We categorized the par-
ticipants into three groups: students, employees of a company,
and unrestricted population (i.e., participants sampled from a
general population). Empty cells in the table show the areas
that remain unexplored. Although there are lots of arguments
in the literature about the lab versus real world experiment
[208]–[210], based on Table XXI, it is clear that both types of
experiments are popular among researchers. No study on em-
ployees has been conducted in the lab environment. Although
the real world experiment is more general in comparison to
the lab experiment, the lab experiment helps the researcher
analyze human behavior in more detail and understand the
factors that affect their responses.
Apart from the type and number of participants, the vari-
ables that are being studied play an important role on the
quality of the experiment. While on one hand, studying several
variables helps to look at different aspects at the same time;
on the other, it makes the experiment more complicated
and probably requires more participants. In the next section
we discuss variables that have been studied in the reviewed
literature.
B. Experimental Attributes
Table XXII groups the literature based on the context,
evaluation, and whether or not deception was involved in the
studies. Based on the table, it is obvious that there is more
research on emails than webpages. Another observation is the
lack of a long-term study. People’s behavior can change over
time, so it is important to redo the experiment after a long
period of time to see how their behavior changes. We also
mentioned the variables that each work studied in Table XXII.
Although there are a few works that study several attributes
together, most of the existing works study the effect a single
variable (e.g. personality) on participants’ phishing detection
ability.
Multiple Comparisons Problem: We noticed that several
papers, e.g., [61], [217], [222], [224]–[226], [232]–[234],
[238], [241], [242], [246], [247], [249], [263], made their
statistically significant conclusion by running multiple tests
on a single dependent variable. Multiple comparisons problem
causes incorrect rejection of null hypothesis, if not accompa-
nied by p-value adjustment (increases type 1 error) [267]. Bon-
ferroni [268] is the simplest way to adjust the p-value, which
is too conservative in rejecting the null hypothesis (increases
type 2 error). More complex methods like Holm-Bonferroni
and Benjamini-Hochberg [269] can be used to lower type 1
and 2 errors simultaneously (compared to Bonferroni).
In the next section, we give a brief summary of the
works selected based on how thoroughly they covered the
aforementioned attributes, involving emails or websites (some
with deception and some without).
C. Selected User Study Literature
Studies on users’ behaviour are not completely aligned
with the challenges we described in Section IV. Therefore,
instead of selecting the papers based on those challenges, we
evaluate the literature based on the following: 1) how many
different variables were studied; 2) context (email or website);
3) environment; and 4) whether or not it includes deception.
Researchers in [202] studied the effect of psychological
traits on people’s ability to detect email phishing attacks and
online information sharing. They sent a “prize scam” email
to 100 students from a psychology class that requested an
immediate response. They also asked about the privacy settings
of participants on Facebook, the frequency of posting, type of
data they posted, etc. The results show that for women, certain
personality traits (neuroticism and openness) are more likely
to be associated with vulnerability to phishing attacks as well
as with online information sharing on a social network.
The effect of priming people on detection of phishing
emails has been studied in [219]. They divided a total of 117
participants into two groups. One group was not informed
that they are participants in a phishing study, but the other
group was informed. As expected, their results indicate, that
informed participants perform better than not-informed partic-
ipants. Also, they found that background computer knowledge
improves participants’ phishing detection rate.
A few studies investigated the relationship of brain activity
with phishing and other security-related tasks. Researchers
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TABLE XXI: Type of participants and the environment of phishing user studies
Environment Type of Participants Number of Participants<50 ≥50 and <200 ≥200
Lab
Student [61], [204], [211]–[218] [153], [219]–[225], [226]a, [227]a [228]–[233], [234]a
Employee [235]a
Unrestricted [203], [236], [237]a [238], [239], [240]a, [241]a [242], [243], [244]a
Real
Student [245] [202], [246], [247] [201], [248]–[251]
Employee [252] [253]–[255] [10], [256], [257]
Unrestricted [217], [258]–[260] [213], [261]–[266]
a Studies that only asked participants about their vulnerability (Q/A) instead of showing them the email/website
TABLE XXII: Parameters of phishing user studies: length, long-term or not, context, deception, and variables used. DR -
Detection Rate, BK - Background Knowledge, CP - Cognitive Process, PR - Personality
Long-term context deception N Literature VariablesDR BK CP PR
No Email Yes 13 [220], [221], [228], [246], [251], [259][10], [201], [223], [231], [248], [255], [257] X
3 [202], [256], [262] X X
2 [222], [254] X X
1 [266] X X
4 [225], [229], [247], [265] X X X
2 [233], [252] X X X
1 [219] X X X X
No 6 [10], [230], [238], [249], [250], [258] X3 [242], [260], [263] X X
Webpage
Yes 5 [204], [239], [245], [253], [261] X
No
4 [203], [212], [236], [264] X
3 [211], [213], [216] X X
3 [61], [217], [218] X X X
1 [214] X X X
Yes Email Yes 1 [232] X X
in [211] and [214] used Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging (fMRI) and Electroencephalogram (EEG) to measure
brain’s electrical activity and an eye-tracker to have a better
understanding of users’ decision-making process. They used
both existing phishing websites (by downloading and hosting
them on their own network) and manually created ones. The
EEG results show that at a subconscious level, there might
be hidden differences in how users detect real and fake
websites. The fMRI results show an increase in brain activity
(on regions related to decision-making, attention and problem
solving) during the detection task. Although participants tried
to process the existing information to differentiate between
real and fake webpages, their performance still low. This
suggests that people may not have enough knowledge about
the cues that really need their attention. The eye-gaze pattern
captured by the eye-tracker revealed that participants did not
pay enough attention to the cues that show whether a webpage
is real or fake (“less time on URL; more time on login field
or website logo”).
Training is one of the techniques to help people avoid
phishing attacks. Attackers may choose a domain name very
similar to the domain name of the target company, e.g.,
bank0famerica.com (using ‘0’ instead of the letter ‘o’). So, can
we say that paying attention to the URL will help detect some
of the phishing websites? To answer this question, researchers
did a study on the effectiveness of highlighting the domain
in helping people detect phishing webpages [204]. A group
of 22 people were showed 16 webpages (8 legitimate and 8
fraudulent) and asked how safe these websites are. Then they
asked participants to re-evaluate the same 16 webpages by
focusing on the address bar. They categorized the participants
into three types based on which clues they observed: A) those
who pay attention to the content of the webpage, B) those who
pay attention to the information found in the address bar and
AB) those who rely primarily on the content and sometimes
use the address bar information. Their results show that the
domain name highlighting is not effective for type A and AB
participants. So, domain name highlighting cannot be used as
a single method for detecting phishing webpages. A similar
study has been done on a larger scale (320 participants), which
resulted in a similar conclusion [213].
So far, we only discussed user studies on regular phishing
attacks. Training people to detect spear phishing attacks is also
important, since these attacks are harder to detect automati-
cally due to their targeted nature, thus we review them in the
next section.
D. Spear phishing
Despite the importance of spear phishing attacks, we found
only two user studies on this type of attack [10], [252]. In both
works, spear phishing emails were sent to the employees of
a company. The goal in [10] is to study the effect of training
on employees (1369 employees), while the goal of [252] is to
study the employees’ (40 employees) vulnerability to spear
phishing attack. It has been shown in [10] that immediate
feedback is not enough for increasing people’s awareness.
They sent a series of carefully crafted spear phishing emails
to the employees and gave them immediate training whenever
they fell for an attack. The study in [252] found that there
is a correlation between users’ conscientiousness and their
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responses to the spear phishing. Another interesting finding
is the negative correlation between participants’ subjective
estimate of their own vulnerability and the likelihood of being
phished.
We conclude this section by reviewing the unexplored areas
in the existing research and some suggestion for future works.
E. Opportunities for Future Research
Based on Table XXI, the important missing studies are: a
deep analysis of participants’ reasoning on (1) real-world stud-
ies with unrestricted participants and (2) in-lab experiments
with employees. There is typically an inverse relationship
between the depth of behavioral analysis and the number of
participants. The fewer the participants, the better researchers
can analyze the responses of each participant individually. An
employee-only study is also important because many of the
spear phishing studies use employees of a company as their
target.
Another missing study is a comparison between conducting
the same experiment in the lab or in a real-world situation.
There is only one study in which the experiment was con-
ducted in both real and lab environment [217]. Researchers
first ran the experiment in the lab to have more control, and
then, to increase confidence and power (by increasing the
number of participants), they did the experiment in a real
scenario. Although they showed that results from real and
lab environment are similar, their goal was not to compare
these two environments. Also, there is only one study that
considers long-term effects (Table XXII) in their experiment
design [232]. They re-tested the participants (primary school
students) after two and four weeks of conducting a phishing
training (interactive presentation). Surprisingly, their results
showed that after a gap of four weeks, the performance of
the participants diminished to the level before the training had
occurred. The main limitation of their work is that they used a
paper-based questionnaire to record participants performance
instead of showing them the email/webpage on the computer.
More studies with diverse populations are needed to make
a general conclusion about the temporal effect on people’s
performance.
As we mentioned, only two groups studied users’ behaviour
on spear phishing attacks. More studies are required to under-
stand the different aspects of spear phishing attacks as well
as how people respond to them. Then training techniques can
be developed based on the results of these studies to increase
people’s awareness about the risk of spear phishing attacks.
XI. RELATED WORK
Phishing has been the topic of several surveys as well as
books. We organize the related work along the major themes:
emails, websites, URLs, user studies, and general surveys. The
last category includes those surveys that examine more than
one dimension of phishing detection. We conclude this section
by mentioning surveys on two related areas: spam detection
and web page classification.
Emails. There is one survey that focuses primarily on
phishing email literature [270]. In this 2013 survey, the re-
searchers review mostly on machine-learning techniques for
email filtering, and their relative advantages and disadvantages.
They also classify the approaches proposed in the literature
according to different stages of the attack flow as: network
level protection, authentication, client side tool, user education,
and server side filters and classifiers. We discuss other email
surveys under General surveys.
URLs. Recently a survey on phishing URL detection has be-
come available [31]. In this survey, features for phishing URL
detection are covered, and different kinds of machine learning
techniques are surveyed: batch, on-line, representation, and
“other.” Also, [271], [272] survey a few papers on phishing
URL detection, and [9], [11], [273] discuss some of the issues
and literature associated with phishing URL detection.
Websites. Three teams of researchers have surveyed phish-
ing website detection [32], [274], [275]. In [274], phishing
website detection papers were studied along five dimensions:
blacklist/whitelist, instantaneous protection, decision support
tools, community rating tools such as Web of Trust, and
intelligent heuristics, for the first time. Subsequently, Varshney
et al. [275] added search-based, visual-similarity, DNS-based,
and proactive phishing URL based techniques. They also
discussed pros and cons for each type of detection technique
and some selected papers, for which they summarized results
and dataset sizes. In [32], three criteria were used to select
papers for discussion (novelty, attention – measured by a
number of citations, and completeness). In a more recent
study of phishing techniques [276], the authors give a detailed
description of how content-based methods have been used
for phishing detection in previous literature. The researchers
provide a brief history of phishing along with an analysis of
automatic detection methods and how they help fight phishing
website attacks.
User studies. To the best of our knowledge, there is no
comprehensive survey of user studies of phishing or spear
phishing, although some surveys, e.g., [9], [11], [273], [277],
discuss it as part of their taxonomy, training, or study of
selected solutions. In [278], the authors survey a few papers
on user studies.
General surveys. In a 2012 survey, the author surveyed
a range of countermeasures for phishing, ranging from email
detection to training and legal studies [277]. In a 2013 survey,
[278], researchers examined 20 proposed solutions in detail.
These included both software detection techniques as well as
some training approaches for human awareness and vulner-
ability. In [9], researchers have given: a nice taxonomy of
phishing attacks and defenses, identified features for phishing
email detection, and compared 15 phishing email detection
techniques and 15 phishing website detection techniques over
the period 2000-2016. In [11], some dataset sources are
listed, taxonomies are discussed with more examples, features
for phishing email detection are listed and 18 solutions are
discussed over the period 2000-2016.
In a 2017 phishing survey [273], researchers have proposed
a new, multi-dimensional phishing taxonomy and classified
phishing countermeasures in five categories: machine learning,
text mining, human users, profile matching, and others, with
the last category further subdivided into: search engines,
ontology, client-server authentication, and honeypot counter-
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TABLE XXIII: Comparing earlier phishing surveys with the present survey. Year range - publication years of papers reviewed
Survey YearRange
Detection Techniques User
Studies
Aspects Security
ChallengesURL Web Email DatasetDiversity Features
Detection
Methods
Evaluation
Metrics
Gupta et. al. [9] 2005-2016 X X X
Gupta et. al. [11] 2004-2016 X X X
Chiew et. al. [19] 2004-2017 X X X X X
Dou et. al. [32] 2005-2016 X
Almomani et. al. [270] 2004-2012 X X X X X
Satane and Dasgupta [271] 2007-2014 X X X
Sharma and Parveen [272] 2012-2015 X X X X
Aleroud and Zhou [273] 2005-2015 X X X X
Mohammad et. al. [274] 2004-2012 X X X
Varshney et. al. [275] 2004-2016 X X X
Purkait [277] 2004-2011 X X X
Khonji et. al. [278] 2006-2011 X X X X X
Qabajeh et. al. [276] 2005-2017 X X
This Survey 2004-2018 X X X X X X X X X
measures. They compare anti-phishing tools, both commercial
and research prototypes, and identify gaps in literature in terms
of unstudied or little-studied attack vectors and communication
channels. A 2018 survey [19] on phishing reviews popular
techniques and vectors or channels for phishing operations. It
presents in detail several techniques and propagation methods
for social engineering attacks as well as evaluate how such ex-
isting methods can be combined to launch more sophisticated
attacks in future.
Two related areas worth mentioning are spam detection
and web page classification. Although the goals of spam
and phishing are different, and phishing detection is more
challenging because of deception, there are similarities in the
approaches, algorithms, and features that have been employed.
We refer the reader to the survey of spam detection for more
details [279]. By comparing the work on spam detection
and on phishing detection, we observe that phishing work
has not utilized text mining and natural language processing
techniques as much as spam detection. Web page classification
also exploits text classification techniques. We refer to [280]
for an excellent survey on web page classification.
We summarize our observations about the phishing surveys
in Table XXIII. No previous work, to our knowledge, has
attempted to systematize and evaluate the phishing literature
from the perspective of security challenges or dataset diversity,
and we did not find any previous survey of spear phishing
research literature.
XII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have covered phishing and spear phishing
detection techniques and user studies from the perspective of
security challenges. To our knowledge, this is the first system-
atic survey of these important topics from this viewpoint, and
the only comprehensive survey of spear phishing research and
user studies of phishing/spear phishing. We identified several
opportunities for future research. Specifically, we found that
deep learning techniques have not been exploited much in
phishing detection. A large number of papers use a wide
variety of features, but do not include any information about
feature importance or feature selection – this is important
since using many features can slowdown system performance.
Other gaps include: the lack of proper datasets29 and metrics
for evaluation, and lack of diverse population in user studies
and long-term experiments. Our systematization reviews and
outlines the common security challenges prevalent in cyber-
security, which can be utilized for the evaluation of future
research on these topics and may lead to improved and more
practical schemes.
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APPENDIX
In the Appendix, we give tables with bibliographic numbers
of the papers, so that interested readers can easily find the
original sources for each entry in our tables in the main part
of the paper.
TABLE A1: Distribution of metrics used for evaluating phish-
ing URL detection methods
Eval. Metrics N Literature
Accuracy 28
[21], [29], [30], [34]–[36], [42], [63], [64], [69], [80]
[33], [44], [53], [55], [56], [66], [79], [86], [89]
[22], [48], [50]–[52], [77], [81], [88]
Precision
Recall
F-score
20 [30], [33]–[35], [47], [58]–[60], [69], [86][22], [29], [50]–[52], [62]–[64], [70], [89]
Error Rate 13 [21], [28], [34], [39], [40], [43], [49][38], [65], [67], [73], [85], [89]
Confusion
Matrixa 20
[35], [43]–[46], [48], [57], [69], [76], [80], [82]
[29], [50], [51], [58], [66], [78], [79], [88], [89]
Area Under
Curve 4 [33], [35], [50], [51]
Othersb 6 [42], [57], [80], [54], [78], [81]
a Consists of the raw True Positive, False Positive, True Negative, False Negative
values as well as rates like TPR, FPR, TNR, FNR, specificity and sensitivity
calculated from the confusion matrix.
b Balanced Success Rate [38], Root Mean Square Error [42], effective
rules/patterns [54], Cost/Sum of classification [80], False Alarm rate [78]
TABLE A2: Distribution of metrics used for evaluating phish-
ing website detection methods
Eval. Metrics N Literature
Accuracy 26
[100]–[102], [111], [112], [119], [122]–[124], [126]
[98], [115], [117], [120], [128], [129], [147], [150]
[95], [131], [137], [141], [148], [154]–[156]
Precision
Recall
F-score
27
[94], [96], [101], [112], [133], [152], [155], [157], [158]
[102], [113], [118], [141], [144], [148]–[150]
[98], [104]–[107], [120], [123], [136], [143], [154]
Error Rate 21 [93], [95]–[97], [120], [121], [129], [140], [147], [157], [158][106], [123], [125], [128], [136]–[138], [146], [152], [155]
Confusion
Matrix 35
[96], [98]–[100], [102]–[109], [157], [158]
[113]–[115], [119]–[123], [134], [142], [146]
[94], [111], [117], [129]–[132], [153]–[156]
Area Under
Curve 8 [98], [101], [102], [104], [106], [107], [113], [135]
Othersa 7 [94], [110], [118], [123], [136], [151], [155]
a Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC) [136], [155], Precision-recall curve [94],
Kappa statistic [118], [123], MCscore [110] and Text Similarity [151]
TABLE A3: Distribution of metrics used for evaluating phish-
ing email detection methods
Eval. Metrics N Literature
Accuracy 14
[164], [165], [185], [189]
[166], [169], [172], [179], [180], [193]
[163], [183], [187], [191]
Precision
Recall
F-score
12 [179], [185], [198][168], [171], [172], [175], [181], [182], [188]–[190]
Confusion
Matrixa 14
[168], [179], [185], [186]
[169], [175], [188], [196]–[198]
[161], [163], [171], [190]
Area Under
Curve 7 [165], [166], [171], [184], [188]–[190]
Error Rate 2 [167], [179]
Otherb 4 [180], [188], [192], [193]
a Consists of the raw True Positive, False Positive, True Negative, False Negative
values as well as rates like TPR, FPR, TNR, FNR, specificity and sensitivity
calculated from the confusion matrix
b Miscellaneous metrics used by different authors. One-Error, Coverage and
Average Precision [193], G-Mean [188], Rand Index (RI) [192] , Root Mean
Square Error (RMSE) [180]
TABLE A4: Methods used in phishing URL detection: Types,
Algorithms and Literature
Types Algorithms N Literature
Supervised
Decision Tree 15 [30], [34], [41], [64], [77], [79][21], [35], [44], [49]–[52], [59], [62]
Bayesian Classifier 1 [34]
Logistic Regression 11 [35], [43], [44], [47], [67], [79][21], [28], [49], [63], [81]
Naïve Bayes 11 [35], [43], [44], [52], [63], [77][21], [30], [41], [49], [62]
Support Vector Machines 12 [21], [40], [43], [49]–[51], [77][28], [29], [41], [63], [66]
RandomForest 14 [21], [41], [44], [49]–[52], [64][30], [58], [59], [63], [77], [79]
BayesNet 4 [44], [62], [64], [79]
RandomTree 4 [50]–[52], [79]
AdaBoost 2 [21], [77]
Stacking 1 [21]
RNN-LSTM 1 [33]
LMT 3 [50]–[52]
k-Nearest Neighbors 3 [35], [52], [59]
Unsupervised k-Means Clustering 2 [53], [68]
Online
Learning
Perceptron 5 [22], [28], [38], [40], [80]
Multilayer Perceptron 3 [49], [52], [62]
Confidence Weighted 8 [22], [28], [36], [40][55], [65], [80], [85]
AROWa 2 [22], [40]
Passive Aggressive 4 [22], [28], [80], [85]
Cost sensitiveb 1 [80]
Not mentioned 1 [53]
Rule/Pattern
based
PART 3 [21], [50], [51]
JRip 2 [50], [51]
Association Rule Mining 1 [54]
Greedy Pattern Selection 1 [55]
TFD Pattern Matching 1 [75]
Others MD5 Hash Algorithms,HMM, BFTree 3 [44], [58], [70]
a Adaptive Regularization of Weights
b Learners (CS-OAL, CS-Passive Aggressive, Label Efficient perceptron etc.)
mentioned in the paper [80]
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TABLE A5: Methods used in reviewed phishing website
detection literature
Method N Literature
SVM 20
[100], [112]–[114], [120]–[123], [156]
[96], [132], [135], [141], [157], [158]
[106], [144], [150], [152], [155]
Naïve Bayes 12 [93], [101], [112], [141], [154], [156][106], [118], [136], [148]–[150]
Logistic Regression 14 [93], [96], [101], [112], [141], [150], [154]–[156][106], [118], [120], [127], [129]
Random Tree 2 [93], [151]
Random Forest 7 [93], [101], [102], [106], [120], [148], [150]
Decision Tree 14 [93], [101], [105], [106], [125], [154]–[156][118], [120], [124], [140], [141], [148]
CART 1 [155]
Bayesian Network 4 [93], [101], [120], [136]
Multilayer Perceptron 1 [120]
BFTree 1 [101]
Gradient Boosting 1 [98]
Tree Kernel 1 [141]
Neural Network 6 [106], [119], [138], [144], [154], [155]
Regression Trees (RT)
Bayesian Additive RT
Bagging
1 [106]
AdaBoost 3 [106], [120], [155]
Bagging 1 [155]
k-Nearest Neighbor 4 [100], [118], [122], [155]
Hierarchical Clustering 1 [149]
DBSCAN Clustering 1 [128]
Association rule 3 [124], [125], [140]
TABLE A6: Methods used in reviewed phishing email detec-
tion literature. EM- Expectation Maximization
Method N Literature
Bagging 3 [166], [182], [191]
Boosting 6 [167] [169], [178], [189], [190][191]
Bayesian Network 2 [169], [182]
Decision Table 2 [167], [169]
Decision Tree 8 [166], [181], [188], [191][170], [171], [182], [189]
k-means 4 [168], [187], [192], [194]
k-Nearest Neighbor
(kNN) 5 [181], [182], [187], [191], [195]
Logistic Regression 1 [181]
Neural Network 2 [180], [195]
Naïve Bayes 6 [167], [168], [188], [191][171], [189]
Random Forest 9 [165], [167]–[169], [178], [182], [191][171], [189]
SVM 13 [163], [164], [168], [175], [185], [189], [191][171], [172], [179], [181], [184], [188]
EM Clustering 1 [183]
Multi-layer Perceptron 2 [168], [171]
Othera 7 [167], [180], [182], [187], [188], [192], [195]
a OneR [167], Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) [180], SMO [182], Associative
Petri network [188], multinomial Naive Bayes (MNB), DCClust, MS-MGKM,
k-committees [187], INCA [192], Kernel Density Estimation (KDE), Gaussian
Mixture Model (GMM) [195]
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TABLE A7: Range of dataset size used by each work for evaluation, separately for legitimate, spam and malware URLs
Legitimate
100s 1,000s 10,000s 100,000s ≥1M Feed N/A
Phishing
100s [46], [76][54], [79] [54]
1,000s [40], [52], [62][30], [81] [43] [45]
10,000s [42], [64], [88]
[41], [43], [47]
[21], [49]–[51], [70]
[66], [80]
[59], [65], [77]
[41], [49], [59]
[56], [63], [66]
[67], [77], [80]
[35], [41]
[70], [77]
100,000s [39], [73], [89] [28]
≥1M
[22], [28], [69]
[39], [85], [87]
[29], [33], [70]
[75]
Feed [65], [72]
N/A
[34], [36], [37]
[44], [58], [74]
[53]
Spam
1,000s [45]
10,000s [43] [59] [22]
Feed [65], [72]
Malware 1,000s [40], [82]
[35], [39]
[45], [85]
10,000s [59]
TABLE A8: Range of dataset size used by each work for evaluation, separately for legitimate, phishing and malicious websites
Legitimate
100s 1,000s 10,000s 100,000s ≥1 M N/A
Phishing
100s [109], [127], [131][103], [108], [114]
[119], [122], [130], [144]
[107]
1,000s [113], [125], [132][123]
[111], [124], [141], [143]
[99], [128], [154], [157]
[106], [117], [120], [121], [155]
[104], [136] [98], [148] [115], [150][133], [140]
10,000s [105], [110], [149][100]–[102], [147] [118] [121]
[137], [158]
[153]
100,000s [94] [145]
N/A [151]
[88], [116], [125], [126]
[129], [134], [135]
[97], [138], [139]
[96], [142], [146]
Malicious
100s [95]
1,000s [122] [158]
10,000s [157] [152] [93], [156]
TABLE A9: Range of dataset size used by each work for evaluation, separately for legitimate and phishing emails
Legitimate
100s 1,000s 10,000s 100,000s ≥1 M N/A
Phishing
100s [182]–[185] [165], [168], [177], [188][180]
1,000s [162], [168]–[171], [176][166], [178], [181] [161], [167], [172], [175]
[162], [187], [192]–[194]
[174], [199]
10,000s [190] [179], [191]
100,000s
N/A [187], [192] [186] [163] [189]
Spam 100s [188]
1,000s [170]
10,000s [163], [175], [191]
Malicious 100s [188]
Spear
100s [163]
1000s [173]
N/A [197] [164] [195] [196]
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TABLE A10: Description of Features Extracted from URLs, Websites (marked with uW) and Emails (marked with uE). N -
Number of papers using each feature
Type Features N Used in Literature
Lexical
URL length 43 U,W,E [21], [28], [33], [35], [36], [38], [40], [43], [44], [49], [53], [54], [58], [59], [65], [72], [85], [89]uW: [98], [100], [102], [105], [112], [119]–[127], [129], [138], [140], [148], [152], [154]–[156], [158] uE: [162]
Length of URL paramsa 15 U,W [28], [33], [35], [36], [40], [43], [53], [65], [67], [77], [80], [82]uW: [100], [121], [149]
Token/Word Frequency in URL 22 U,W,E [28], [34]–[36], [38], [43], [50], [51], [53], [54], [57], [58], [65], [66], [80], [82]uW: [98], [100], [108], [129], [152], uE: [165]
Black-List Word frequency in URL 14 U,W,E [33], [35], [43], [89], uW: [107], [109]–[111], uE: [165], [167], [168], [170], [172], [175], [178]
Digit/Letter Frequencies/Ratio 7 U [21], [35], [36], [59], [76], [80], [85]
Number of dots (.) 30 U,W,E [28], [34], [38], [40], [43], [44], [49], [52], [54], [59], uE: [165], [167], [170]–[172], [175], [178], [181], [182], [184]uW: [107], [113], [114], [120], [121], [123], [125], [138], [144], [148], [150]
Characterb frequency in URL path 25 U,W,E [35], [38], [43], [49], [54], [58], [59], [85], uE: [182], [189]uW: [93], [98], [100], [102], [106], [114], [122]–[124], [127], [150], [152], [154], [158]
Kolmogorov Complexity 2 U,W [21] uW: [121]
Character N-grams 2 U [22], [75]
URL Entropy 1 U [33]
Edit distance, KL-Divergence,
KS-test 3 U,W [21], [33], uW: [105]
Obfuscation
Frequency of Special Characters 32 U,W,E [33], [38], [44], [49], [52], [54], [59], [81], uE: [167], [169], [170], [177], [178], [191]uW: [107], [112]–[114], [119]–[121], [124]–[127], [132], [140], [150], [152], [155], [156], [158]
Obfuscation in IP Address 8 U,W,E [36], [43], [69], [73], [76], [80], uW: [126], uE: [178]
Encodings in URL 9 U,W,E [38], [44], [54], [59], [81], uW: [125], [127], [150], uE: [182]
Shortening in URL 7 U,W [30], [34], [63], [87], [89], uW: [126], [155]
Spoofing in URL path 3 U,W [59], [81], uW: [127]
Source/destination URLs mismatch 5 U,W,E [29], [30], [87], uW: [129], uE: [187]
IP address instead of domain name 55 U,W,E
[21], [33]–[36], [38], [40], [43], [49], [52], [54], [59], [65], [76], [80], [85]
uW: [106], [107], [112], [114], [119], [120], [144], [152], [155]
uW: [93], [94], [96], [122]–[127], [132], [138]–[140], [150], [154], [157], [158]
uE: [166]–[172], [177], [181]–[185]
Hostname obfuscation f 15 U,W,E [28], [34]–[36], [45], [46], [49], [59], [76], [80], [81], uW: [138], [140], uE: [171], [185]
DNS based
Misspelled/Bad domain name 8 U [36], [42], [43], [56], [69], [72], [80], [89]
Top Level Domain features 22 U,W,E [36], [38], [43], [46], [65], [69], [70], [78], [85],uW: [105], [107], [110], [113], [138], [139], [152], [154], [157], uE: [163], [170], [182], [194]
TTLc value of DNS 9 U,W,E [28], [43], [47], [70], uW: [93], [102], [132], [144], uE: [186]
Age of Domain 13 U,W,E [52], uW: [107], [113], [119], [120], [124], [125], [127], [132], [150], [154], [155], uE: [182]
Rankingd based features 30 U,W,E [28], [33], [42], [49]–[52], [56], [58], [66], [76], [81], [88], uE: [182], [186]uW: [94], [100], [102], [105], [107], [111], [113], [114], [120], [122], [126], [131], [132], [154], [155]
Hostname
based
Frequency of Tokens 12 U,W [28], [35], [36], [38], [45], [46], [52], [65], [66], [80], [81], uW: [94]
Longest Token 6 U [35], [36], [44], [45], [66], [85]
Frequency of Digits 3 U [45], [46], [85]
Frequency of Special characters 8 U,W [28], [34], [35], [76], [80], [85], uW: [127], [132]
Port presence 18 U,W,E [36], [38], [40], [49], [58], [67], [70]uW: [96], [126], [144], [152], [154], [158], uE: [167], [168], [170], [178], [180]
HTTPS or HTTP 15 U,W [38], [54], [65], uW: [96], [98], [102], [105], [114], [120], [123], [125], [126], [140], [154], [155]
IP address
based
Characters and digits in IP address 3 U [36], [47], [62]
IP address in octal/hex form 5 U,E [34], [65], [76], [81], uE: [168]
Blacklisted IP address 5 U,W [28], [43], uW: [96], [102], [132]
Whitelisted IP address 3 U,W [78], [88], uW: [132]
IP records and prefix checking 4 U,W,E [43], [80], uW: [155], uE: [182]
WHOIS
properties
Registration details 14 U,W [36], [40], [43], [47], [58], [80], uW: [96], [127], [130], [131], [134], [152], [154], [158]
Creation/Update/Expiration time 27 U,W,E [28], [30], [36], [40], [43], [47], [58], [66], [76], [80], uE: [177], [182], [193]uW: [93], [102], [106], [112], [119], [122], [124], [126], [127], [132], [148], [150], [152], [158]
AS number 8 U,W,E [36], [40], [44], uW: [94], [104], [152], [158], uE: [182]
Status of WHOIS entry 7 U [28], [36], [40], [43], [47], [58], [80]
Geographic
properties
Locatione of IP address origin 20 U,W,E [28], [40], [43], [46], [49], [79], [80], [82]uW: [93], [94], [96], [112], [113], [121], [129], [152], [157], [158], uE: [191], [195]
Nature/speed of connection 5 U [28], [36], [43], [46], [49]
Shortened
URL
features
Initial and Landing URL 6 U,W [60], [69], uW: [129], [138], [140], [157]
Redirects on each page 5 U,W [62], [64], [87], uW: [129], [155]
URL Redirect Chain length 16 U,W [29], [30], [60], [62], [79], uW: [100], [105], [112], [124], [125], [127], [129], [148], [154], [156], [157]
Frequency of entry point URL 4 U [29], [30], [60], [87]
Position of entry point URLs 3 U [29], [60], [64]
# of URLs/Landing URLs 2 U [29], [60]
# of domain names and IPs 6 U,E [29], [62], [63], [87], uE: [167], [182]
a A URL usually has the following parts: scheme, host, path, query string.
Source:https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/en/SSGMCP_5.1.0/com.ibm.cics.ts.internet.doc/topics/dfhtl_uricomp.html
b Characters like period, slash, etc.
c Time to live
d Alexa Ranking, PageRank scores, search engines lookup
e Continent/country/city
f Hexadecimal encoding
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TABLE A11: Description of the features used in phishing website detection. N - Number of papers using each feature
Feature Source Features N Literature
Network
Domain registration info. 8 [96], [112], [119], [122], [131], [138], [150], [151]
Registrar ID 3 [138], [152], [158]
# of Nameservers 3 [100], [112], [148]
DNS record 12 [93], [99], [102], [104], [117], [119], [124], [125], [127], [138], [150], [155]
# of DNS queries 1 [156]
HTTP header (content-type, content-length,
Server, X-Powered-By, ...) 4 [96], [152], [156], [158]
Alexa rank 5 [98], [102], [119], [127], [130]
Gmail Reputation 1 [94]
# of bytes/packets transferred, duration 2 [100], [156]
Fake HTTP protocol 1 [124]
# of IP/port upon complete download 1 [156]
SSL Certification attributes 9 [96], [113], [114], [118], [124], [127], [132], [140], [154]
HTML
# of various tag types 10 [93], [96], [98], [100], [102], [112], [122], [139], [149], [151]
HTML tag attributes 10 [96], [107], [114], [115], [119], [135], [137], [149], [151], [154]
Term Frequency 13 [94], [96], [106]–[108], [111], [112], [114], [117], [119], [128], [131], [144]
# of element out of place 2 [107], [112]
# of small/hidden elements 2 [93], [122]
# of suspicious elements 3 [93], [102], [142]
# of suspicious objects 2 [93], [102]
# of internal/external links 22 [93], [94], [96], [100], [102], [119], [122], [124], [127], [132], [154]–[156][107], [114], [117], [125], [128], [135], [139], [144], [150]
NULL links on site and footer 2 [120], [144]
More than one head tag/document 2 [93], [122]
invisible frames 5 [93], [95], [100], [122], [124]
# of specific file type
(image, video, binary, system file, ...) 4 [96], [98], [121], [158]
Visual 9 [96], [103], [104], [108], [128], [133], [135], [142], [149]
# of iframes 9 [93], [98], [100], [102], [122], [126], [154]–[156]
DOM-tree 3 [97], [107], [143]
ActiveX function 1 [102]
Right click disabled 8 [102], [125]–[127], [138], [140], [154], [155]
Server Form Handler 2 [127], [155]
Login form detection 4 [107], [109], [119], [132]
External term frequency 1 [98]
Javascript
keywords to words ratio
# of suspicious string 2 [93], [122]
# of long strings (>40, >51) 3 [93], [122], [156]
decoding routines, shellcode detection,
# of iframe strings 1 [93]
# of DOM modifying functions,
# of event attachment 3 [93], [102], [122]
# of suspicious objects 3 [93], [100], [122]
# of scripts 2 [139], [156]
# of func. (eval, setInterval, OnMouseOver...) 9 [100], [102], [122], [125]–[127], [140], [154], [156]
Others
Ray Scan Method and
Webpage Layout Similarity 1 [134]
Markov Chain and DISCO 1 [110]
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TABLE A12: Description of the features used in phishing email detection
Feature Source Features N Literature
Header
“Message-ID” 3 [169], [176], [282]
“Received” fields 1 [162]
“From”, “Mail from”, “Sender”, “Mail-to”, “Delivered To” 6 [164], [166], [170], [195] [173], [174]
Authentication-Results (SPF, DKIM, etc.) 1 [162]
“Subject” features (length of the subject, # of words,
# of characters, vocabulary richness, etc.) 8
[164], [166], [173], [178], [185]
[167], [170], [189]
Blacklisted words in “Subject” 4 [168]–[170], [178]
# of words and/or characters in the “Send” field 1 [167]
“Sender” domain , “Reply-to” domain 4 [167], [168], [170], [178]
“Sender” domain , “Message-Id” domain 1 [169]
“Sender” / “From” , email’s modal domains 5 [165], [167], [170], [178], [180]
Timestamp, “Sent date” 3 [163], [164], [173]
Source IP, Autonomous System Number, Origin Country 1 [173]
“Subject”: Fwd, Reply 3 [167], [168], [170]
Interaction habits 1 [163]
“Cc”, “BCc” fields 1 [164]
“X-Mailer”, “X-Originating-IP”, “X-Originating-hostname”,
“X-spam-flag’,“X-virus-scanned’ 1 [164]
Body
Lexical Features (# of words, # of unique words,
# of characters, Tokensa, regular expressions, etc.) 12
[164], [167], [182], [185], [197]
[163], [170], [173], [189]
[161], [162], [171]
Function words (count, frequency distribution, etc.) 4 [163], [167], [173], [185]
Style metrics (number of paragraphs in the email, Yule metric, etc.) 1 [163]
Topic in the body, Latent Semantic Indexing,
Readability Indexes 3 [172], [173], [190]
NLP (Part-of-Speech tags, Named entities,
Wordnet properties, etc.) 5 [161], [162], [164], [171], [190]
Semantic Network Analysis 1 [174]
Vocabulary richness 3 [167], [170], [185]
Urgency, reward, threat language in the body 2 [174], [185]
Greeting in the message 4 [164], [182], [185], [194]
Signature in the message 3 [164], [182], [194]
Farewell in the message 1 [164]
Presence of both “From:” and “To:” in email body 1 [189]
# of linked to domains 1 [165]
URL features 18
[162], [168], [178], [184], [185], [193]
[163], [166], [182], [187], [194]
[170]–[172], [175], [180], [181], [183], [195]
HTML features 13 [165], [168], [175], [181], [182], [189], [193][166], [170], [171], [184], [187], [194]
Presence and/or # of forms in email body 6 [167], [170], [175], [182], [193], [194]
Blacklisted words in the message 10 [165], [167], [168], [175], [178][166], [170]–[172], [180]
Scripts/JavaScripts features in email body 16
[168], [170], [178], [189], [191], [193]
[165], [167], [177], [181], [182], [187]
[166], [172], [175], [194]
# of onClick events in email body 4 [167], [168], [170], [191]
Features from images/logos in the message 6 [174], [175], [182], [187], [189], [193]
Mention of the sender 1 [174]
# of links in email body 10 [165], [167], [180], [182], [193][170], [175], [181], [187], [194]
# of images (links) 9 [166], [167], [175], [180], [189][170]–[172], [194]
# of tables in email body 4 [182], [187], [193], [194]
Recipient’s email address in email body 1 [173]
Phishing terms weight 2 [171], [187]
TFIDF 4 [182], [187], [192], [194]
Email size 3 [182], [188], [194]
# of email body parts 2 [172], [175]
MIME Version or Content-Type: (Multipart/Alternative,
text/plain, text/html) 10
[167], [168], [175], [177], [180]
[164], [166], [188], [189], [193]
JavaScript PopUp Windows 2 [166], [168]
Link displayed , Link in destination 10 [165], [177], [180], [187][171], [172], [183]–[185], [194]
Img links , spoofed target address 3 [168], [175], [184]
Hidden text in the email, Salting techniques 3 [175], [182], [189]
# of internal/external links 6 [166], [167], [170], [172], [175], [180]
External SpamAssassin 5 [168], [172], [175], [177], [178]
Attachment Size in bytes of attachment 1 [173]Number of attachments 2 [185], [187]
a Semantic relations can also be used to add tokens
